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NOTES
TACIT CRIMINAL ADMISSIONS
The doctrine of tacit admissions 1 is firmly entrenched in state and
federal 2 criminal prosecutions. Courts have assumed that a reasonable
juror could find a person more likely to deny an accusation he knows to be
3
false than one he knows to be true. According to one theory, a failure to
1 See generally Annot., 115 A.L.R. 1510 (1938) ; Annot., 80 A.L.R. 1235 (1932).
Although this analysis is limited to criminal cases, some of the same considerations
govern inferred admissions in civil litigation. Civil cases are collected in Annot.,
70 A.L.R.2d 1099 (1960) (accident cases). Some states have incorporated this
judicial doctrine into statutes. "Acquiescence or silence, when the circumstances
require an answer or denial or other conduct, may amount to an admission." GA.
CODE § 38-409 (1933), Emmett v. State, 195 Ga. 517, 535-37, 25 S.E.2d 9, 20-21,
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 774 (1943). Compare CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1870(3);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-401-27(3) (1947).
Efforts to codify and reform the law of evidence have accepted the rule. See
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 507(b) (1942); UNI FoRm RULES OF EViDENCE 1(6),
63(8) (b). The recent New Jersey report based on the Uniform Rules indicates a
more cautious acceptance of the rule, stating that accusations are not admissible
"merely because made to a silent party. The circumstances must indicate that
the 'declarant' by his conduct has actually manifested his adoption or belief in the
truth of the statement . . . ." NEw JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON

(1963). (Emphasis added.)
2The admissibility of evidence in federal criminal trials is based upon federal
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rules of evidence. "The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges
of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
FED. R.
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."
CRrm. P. 26.
3 "[I]t is the nature of innocence to be impatient of a charge of guilt .
"
and an innocent person will usually spontaneously deny the accusation ...
People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 94, 143 N.E. 448, 455 (1924) (alternative holding). The
idea is captured in the Latin phrase qui tacet consentire videtur, "the silence of a party
implies his consent" See BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (4th ed. 1951). However,
the following cliches suggest other reasons for silence: "wise men say nothing in
dangerous times," Seldon, Wisdom, in TABLE TALK 194 (Reynolds ed. 1892), quoted
in Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 429, 32 A.2d 889, 894 (1943) (Maxey, C.J.,
dissenting) ; "silence never betrays you," O'Reilly, Rules of the Road, in ROCHE,
LIFE OF JOHaN BOYLE O'REILLY 532-33 (1891), quoted in State v. Kobylarz, 44 N.J.
Super. 250, 257-58, 130 A.2d 80, 84 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 24 N.J. 548, 133 A.2d
395 (1957) ; "silence never shows itself to so great an advantage as when it is made
in reply to calumny and defamation," ADDISON, The Tatler No. 133, in 4 WORK's
OF JOSEPH ADDISON 144 (Greene ed. 1880), quoted in State v. Kobylarz, supra
at 258, 130 A.2d at 84. Compare the Danish proverb, "The words of a silent
man are never brought to court," quoted in MENCKEN, A NEW DiC'noNARY OF
Other cliches are quoted in Commonwealth v.
QUOTATIONS 1098 (1st ed. 1942).
Vallone, supra at 429, 32 A.2d at 894 (Maxey, C.J., dissenting). The risks of basing
a rule of evidence on a "catchy cliche" have been eloquently criticized. Ibid.
It has been suggested that the question is whether a normal guilty person is
less likely to deny an accusation than a normal innocent person. Note, 35 CALIF.
L. REv. 128, 130 (1947). But guilty persons may be as likely (or more likely) to
deny an injurious statement that is true as one that is false. See State v. Munston,
35 La. Ann. 888 (1883); Note, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 128, 131 (1947). "History is
replete with instances of denial of accusations by the guilty." People v. Todaro, 256
Mich. 427, 435, 240 N.W. 90, 93 (1932) (dissenting opinion). The evidence is
(210)

1963]

TACIT CRIMINAL ADMISSIONS

deny an accusation shows that the accused intended to communicate agreement, and thus adopted the accusation. 4 A second theory holds that
whether or not the accused desired to admit the statement, his failure to
deny was behavior manifesting a consciousness that he was guilty of the
particular crime.8 These theories apparently have not been empirically
tested, but rest solely upon intuitive concepts of normal human conduct.6
Doubt has been cast upon their validity by trained psychoanalysts who
suggest that an accused may manifest guilt feelings from a general sense
of guilt,7 or from guilt of another crime 8
Because of the uncertainty in any given case that an accused's silence
is an implied admission of the statement made, many courts have indicated
that this evidence is "dangerous, and should always be received with
caution." 9 Some courts have accordingly held that evidence of a tacit
admission alone will not sustain a verdict of guilty.10 On balance, howpertinent only if this particular defendant's failure to deny raises a permissible
inference of guilt; ultimately that judgment must be based, however, on a view of
the way a normal person reacts. Commonwealth v. Vallone, .rpra; see Note,
35 CALIF. L. R v. 128, 130 (1947).
4 See Cook v. People, 56 Colo. 477, 487, 138 Pac. 756, 759 (1914).
See generally
Brody, Admissions Impflied From Silence, Evasion and Equivocation in Massachusetts Criminal Cases, 42 B.U.L. REv. 46, 47-48 (1962); McCoRmIcK, EvImcE
§ 247(b),
at 258 (1954) ; 4 WiauoRE, EVIDENCE § 1071 (3d ed. 1940).
5
E.g., People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 712, 172 P.2d 18, 25 (1946), 20
So. CAL. L. REv. 224 (1947). It has been suggested that this theory is preferable to
the adoption theory because it includes such intentional admissions. See McCoRMICK,
(3d ed.
EVIDENCE § 247(b), at 528 (1954); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1072(6) (a)
1940) ; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 507, comment b (1942); Brody, supra note 4,
at 48. However, an accused who knew he was innocent might intend to adopt an
accusation such as "you were there when Leo was killed." Compare text accompanying note 83 infra.
6Griffith v. Commonwealth, 250 Ky. 506, 509, 63 S.W.2d 594, 596 (1933).
Compare State v. Munston, 35 La. Ann. 888 (1883); Commonwealth v. Vallone,
347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943).
However, rules of evidence should consider
clinical and empirical scientific data as well as judicial notions of common sense.
See Miller v. United States, 320 F.2d 767, 773 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (opinion of
Bazelon, C.J.), quoting ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT 102
(1949-1953) (statement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
7 See Miller v. United States, upra note 6, at 772 & n.10, 773 (opinion of
Bazelon, C.J.) ; Hutchins & Schlesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence
-Consciousness
of Guilt, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 737 (1929).
8
See Miller v. United States, supra note 6, at 772 (opinion of Bazelon, C.J.).
See, e.g.,
9 People v. Kennedy, 164 N.Y. 449, 456-57, 58 N.E. 652, 654 (1900).
People v. Nitti, 312 11. 73, 91, 143 N.E. 448, 454-55 (1924) (alternative holding);
Phelan v. State, 114 Tenn. 483, 505-06, 88 S.W. 1040, 1046 (1904).
10 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Karmendi, 328 Pa. 321, 335-36, 195 Atl. 62, 68
(1937) (dictum); Ritter v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 247, 242 S.W. 469 (1922) (by
implication); cf. Commonwealth v. Smith, 342 Mass. 180, 172 N.E.2d 597 (1961)
(dictum). But see State v. Landeros, 20 N.J. 76, 85, 118 A.2d 524, 529 (1955),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956) (questioned in State v. Butler, 32 N.J. 166, 183,
160 A.2d 8, 16-17, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 984 (1960)); State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio
L. Abs. 413, 112 N.E.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1951). Thus one court held that a tacit
admission, presence at the scene of the crime, and flight therefrom were together
insufficient to sustain a murder conviction. State v. Scott, 120 Me. 310, 114 Atl.
159 (1921).
There is less agreement, however, as to whether a tacit admission alone is
sufficient to support other evidence that may require corroboration, e.g., testimony
of an accomplice or of a rape victim. See 7 WIaMoRE, EVIDENCE §§2056, 2060
(3d ed. 1940). Compare People v. Page, 162 N.Y. 272, 56 N.E. 750 (1900), with
Winfree v. State, 174 Tenn. 72, 123 S.W.2d 827 (1939).
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ever, courts have universally upheld 11 the relevancy of evidence that an
accused failed to deny inculpatory statements made in his presence.
Hearsay objections 12 to tacit admissions are more troublesome than
the relevancy issue. Statements uttered out of court are inadmissible to
prove the facts asserted in the statement unless they comply with one of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule. 13 Evidence of a tacit admission consists not
only of the defendant's response or lack thereof, but also of the out-of-court
assertion by another person inculpating the defendant. 14 Although the
hearsay rule would exclude the inculpatory statement were it offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, under the tacit admissions doctrine
the truth of the statement is immaterial, 15 and the only issue is whether it
occurred. Therefore, the reaction of the accused is the only substantive
evidence, 16 and the inculpatory statement is admitted only to explain the
significance of the defendant's response. 17
11 Some judges, however, have questioned the relevance of silence. "Any person
familiar with human history or human nature, ought to know that this premise is
completely unsound." Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 425, 32 A.2d 889, 892
(1943) (Maxey, C.J., dissenting). The dissent was cited with approval in State v.
Kobylarz, 44 N.J. Super. 250, 258, 130 A.2d 80, 84 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 24
N.J. 548, 133 A.2d 395 (1957). The rule "at its best brings about the weakest
assumption known to the law." People v. Todaro, 256 Mich. 427, 435, 240 N.W. 90,
93 (1932) (dissenting opinion). "[T]he versatile conventionalities of human emotions and impulses constitute an erratic and unstable pedestal upon which to perpetrate a rule of law." State v. Kobylarz, supra at 258-59, 130 A.2d at 85.
12The primary basis for the hearsay rule is that cross-examination is necessary
to test the memory, veracity, perception, and demeanor of the declarant. Other
reasons are that the speaker is not under oath, and that out-of-court statements are
more likely to be inaccurately reported than visual observations. See McCoRMIIC,
EVIDENCE § 224, at 457-59 (1954).
13 See generally UNnFoRm RULE OF EvIDEN E 63.
14 Wigmore points out that tacit admissions have aspects both of testimonial and
circumstantial evidence. 4 WGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1052(b) (3d ed. 1940).
15 Thus, an accusation not based on the personal knowledge of the accuser is
admissible. Commonwealth v. Hoff, 315 Mass. 551, 53 N.E.2d 680 (1944). But cf.
State v. Bubis, 39 Idaho 376, 227 Pac. 384 (1924) (suggestion of police overreaching). Similarly, the fact that the accuser is not a competent witness against
the defendant is irrelevant to admissibility of the defendant's reaction to the accusation, as reported by a third party. E.g., Odum v. State, 183 Ga. 854, 190 S.E. 25
(1937) (wife) ; Commonwealth v. Lisowski, 274 Pa. 222, 117 At. 794 (1922) (young
daughter) ; Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 51 N.W. 652 (1892) (wife).
16The tacit admissions rule is analogous to the party admissions exception to
the hearsay rule, which admits out-of-court assertions by a party when offered as
evidence by his opponent, even though the assertion was neither against the
declarant's interest when made, nor about the ultimate issue being tried. The admissions exception satisfies the reasons for the hearsay rule largely because the partydeclarant may testify to explain his assertion. See 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048,
at 3-4 (3d ed. 1940); cf. id. § 1071, at 74. There is also an emotional basis for
the exception which prevents a party from objecting to the admissibility of his
own statements on the ground that they were false. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 239,
at 502-03 (1954). See generally id. § 239.
T
1 McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 247(b) at 529 (1954). Thus, accusations denied by
the defendant are universally excluded, there being no basis for an inference that he
tacitly admitted the accusation. See, e.g., People v. Bob, 29 Cal. 2d 321, 175 P.2d
12 (1946) ; State v. D'Adame, 84 N.J.L. 386, 391-94, 86 Atl. 414, 416-18 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1913) (dictum). "[T]he jury might give credit to the [hearsay] statement
and discredit the denial"-the only substantive evidence. People v. Wilson, 298 Il.
257, 259, 131 N.E. 609, 611 (1921).
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Even though the jury is charged not to use the inculpatory statement
alone as evidence tending to show guilt,' this charge may often be ineffective because "the matter remains in their mind [sic] during their deliberations."' 19 This prejudice factor 20 increases as the accusation becomes
more vivid, because the jury may be less able to disregard it substantively.
The risk of prejudice also increases as the accusation becomes longer and
more detailed until, as with many police accusations, "a great mass of
extraneous hearsay" 21 will be admitted. The jury may forget the risk
that the accused adopted only part of the statement 22 because he had not
"clearly expressed his own meaning." 2 Moreover, there is a danger that
the jury may treat evidence of an implied admission as a confession, 24
which is usually more reliable than an implied admission. 5
Applying these considerations, courts generally have imposed seven
conditions for the introduction of evidence that an alleged admission by
silence occurred.2 6 If silence is the only response by the defendant, the
accusation must have occurred (1) in the defendant's presence 27 and (2)
within his hearing; 2 8 (3) he must have understood it; 29 (4) it ordinarily
8

E.g., Bloomer v. State, 75 Ark. 297, 299, 87 S.W. 438, 439 (1905) (alternative
holding); People v. Davis, 43 Cal. Zd 661, 672, 276 P.2d 801, 807 (1954), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955).
19 People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 717, 172 P.2d 18, 28 (1946), 20 So. CAL.
L. REv. 224 (1947); accord, Territory v. Corum, 34 Hawaii 167, 184 (1937)
(alternative holding); see MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 247(b) at 529 (1954) ; UNIFORM
RULE OF EVIDENCE 6, comment; Heller, Admissions by Acquiescence, 15 U. MIAMI
1

L. REv. 161, 172 (1960).
20 This consideration is absent if the accusation itself is admissible for another
reason-e.g., it qualified as a dying declaration. See text accompanying notes 127-33
infra.
1 People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 719, 172 P.2d 18, 29 (1946).
22 Compare Comment, 6 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 593, 594 (1959).
23
Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 870, 875, 82 S.W. 592, 594 (1904),
quoting 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 200, at 276 (15th ed. 1892).
24 Even judges have referred to tacit admissions as confessions, causing reversal
on appeal. Campbell v. State, 55 Ala. 80, 84 (1876) (trial judge charged that
silence "is a circumstance to which the jury may look as a confession of guilt.");

Polk v. State, 45 Ark. 165, 171-72 (1885) (alternative holding). The Eighth CirArpan v.
cuit has disparaged tacit admissions as "loose, confessional evidence."
United States, 260 F.2d 649, 655 (8th Cir. 1958) (alternative holding), 61 W. VA.
L. REv.320 (1959).
:25Unlike tacit admissions, confessions often will alone support a verdict if
corroborated by a showing that the specified injury occurred by criminal conduct.
See People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 92, 143 N.E. 448, 455 (1924) (alternative holding);
McCoRm Ic , EviDEiCE § 110, at 229-30 (1954).
26 See, e.g., State v. Farnsworth, 383 P.2d 489 (Utah 1963); 4 WimORE,
(3d ed. 1940); Brody, supra note 4, at 49; Heller, mupra
EVEDENCE § 1072(2)-(4)
note 19, at 163-64; Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1266-69 (1954).
27E.g., Moore v. State, 151 Ark. 515, 236 S.W. 846 (1922) (alternative holding).
28
E.g., Irving v. State, 92 Miss. 662, 47 So. 518 (1908) ; Aidt v. State, 2 Ohio
C.C.R. 18 (Crawford County Ct 1886) (alternative holding). It will be presumed,
absent a contrary showing, that statements made in the defendant's presence were
heard by him. Hochreiter v. People, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 363 (N.Y. 1864).
29 Thus statements made in a language defendant did not understand may never
support a tacit admission. E.g., Salon v. State, 70 Fla. 622, 70 So. 603 (1915);
Territory v. Big Knot on Head, 6 Mont. 242, 11 Pac. 670 (1886).
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must have embraced facts within his personal knowledge; 30 (5) he must
have been physically able to speak and (6) psychologically at liberty to
speak; and (7) the statement and surrounding circumstances must have
naturally called for a reply. If, however, the defendant made an ambiguous
statement indicating that these conditions existed, the inquiry is only
whether the response affords a permissible inference of guilt.3 1 Many
courts have recognized that no such inference can be drawn from silence
unless each of the seven elements is present. Agreement on generalities,
however, conceals a wide divergence in judicial application of these
principles.
When tacit admissions allegedly occur in the presence of the police,
additional evidentiary considerations are introduced, and there is a risk
that the constitutional rights of the accused will be undermined. Evidence
of an admission by silence forces the defendant tactically to elect between
his right not to testify at trial and the obvious need to explain his reaction
to the accusation, thus indirectly affecting his privilege against selfincrimination.3 2 This type of evidence also raises a more direct selfincrimination issue to the extent that one purpose of that privilege is to
prevent the silence of an accused in the presence of authorities from being
used against him at trial. Many state and federal courts, therefore, hold
that the arrest of an accused per se excludes evidence of a subsequent
admission by silence. It thus appears appropriate to afford separate treatment to tacit admissions in the presence of the police.
I. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The often meagre probative value of tacit admission evidence and considerations of prejudice inherent in such evidence suggest that a higher
3
standard of admissibility is needed to supplement the seven conditions 3
presently used. No accusation should be presented to the jury if the defendant can convince the trial judge that there was a substantial reason for
his silence consistent with innocence.3 4 Moreover, because of the different
30 Suppose an incarcerated accused is silent when told by a doubting friend,
"You must have done it because the police have plenty of evidence and everyone
thinks you are insane.' None of the facts upon which the accusation is based would
probably be known by the accused to be true or false. See Territory v. Corum, 34
Hawaii 167 (1937) (alternative holding) (excluding a similar statement). A clearer
case would arise if a vacationing employer is silent when told by long distance telephone that his night watchman has just shot and killed a trespassing six-year old.
An express party-admission is usually held admissible, however, although the
declarant lacked personal knowledge of the truth of his assertion. McCoRicx,
EvIDENCE §240, at 506 (1954).
31 See Brody, supra note 4, at 49.
382
Cf. Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770, 776 (5th Cir. 1963) (party-admission).
3 See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
3 4

NEv JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE oN EVIDENCE, REPORT 164 (1963)

states an even more stringent test: "If the silence of the 'declarant! can be construed
as non-assertive, the statement should be excluded." (Emphasis added.)
The silence of an accused may result from his own personality, such as excessive
reticence, rather than adoption or a consciousness of guilt. See Note, 35 CALw.
L. Ray. 128, 130-31 (1947); cf. notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text. Such a
factor could be presented to the judge as a substantial reason for silence consistent
with innocence.
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considerations involved, no admission by silence should be allowed in a
criminal case if the incident occurred either while the accused knew he was
in the presence of the police or after his arrest.3 5
The effectiveness of any admissibility standard is determined by the
procedure used to apply it. Some courts have indicated that the question
of whether the circumstances call for a reply should be determined by the
trial judge " out of the presence of the jury.37 If the evidence is then
excluded, the defendant can suffer no prejudice3 8 This procedure seems
proper because of potential misuse of the accusation by the jury. Moreover, rather than merely determining that a reasonable jury could find that
all seven conditions of admissibility were met,3 9 the trial judge should
exclude the evidence unless he affirmatively finds the seven conditions and
agrees that there was no substantial reason for silence consistent with innocence. The state should have the burden of persuading the court that
35 For example, if he is free on bail. State v. Bates, 140 Conn. 326, 99 A.2d
133 (1953), 15 U. Pivr.L. REv. 376 (1954).
86E.g., Arpan v. United States, 260 F.2d 649, 655 (8th Cir. 1958) (alternative
holding), 61 W. VA. L. REv. 320 (1959); accord, People v. Moore, 27 Cal. Rptr.
526 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) ; Goldsby v. State, 240 Miss. 647, 676, 123 So. 2d 429, 440
(1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 861 (1961) ; NEw JERSEY SUPREME COURT CoMmxIrrEa
ON EVlDENCE, REPORT 164 (1963).
Contra, e.g., State v. Hester, 137 S.C. 145, 191-94,
134 S.E. 885, 901 (1926); cf. Commonwealth v. Locke, 335 Mass. 106, 116-17 n.1,
138 N.E.2d 359, 366 n.5 (1956) (jury decides whether defendant's response was
ambiguous or a denial).
37 See People v. Briggs, 58 Cal. 2d 385, 408-09, 374 P.2d 257, 272-73, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 417, 432-33 (1962) (alternative holding); Lewis v. State, 212 Miss. 775, 55
So. 2d 475 (1951). But see Commonwealth v. Gomino, 200 Pa. Super. 160, 188
A.2d 784 (1963), which affirmed the trial judge's refusal to hold a separate hearing
to determine whether the defendant had been drugged. The defendant requested
the hearing so that he could "testify out of the presence of the jury and thus prevent
the production of his prior record by the Commonwealth. Nothing that the court
did prevented the appellant from taking the stand in his own behalf for the purpose
of showing his condition at the time of . . . [the accusation]." Id. at 170, 188
A.2d at 789. Permitting the jury to hear the evidence without a prior determination
that the circumstances called for a reply puts added pressure on the defendant to
waive his privilege against self-incrimination and testify and reflects both a narrow
view of the scope of the privilege and an overly lenient approach to this "dangerous"

evidence.

Separate hearings involve some duplication if the trial judge finally admits the
evidence, but should obviate many appellate reversals if the judge uses the hearing
critically to exclude evidence that presents a substantial possibility that the defendant's
reaction was consistent with his innocence.
38 Accord, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 507, comment b (1942) ; see People v.
Briggs, supra note 37, at 409-10, 374 P.2d at 273, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 433 (alternative
holding). Courts which permit the evidence to reach the jury pending a jury
decision on a fact which could exclude the evidence reach the anomalous result of
permitting the jury to decide whether evidence is admissible. See Commonwealth v.
Gangi, 243 Mass. 341, 137 N.E. 643 (1923) (whether or not defendant was arrested) ;
Commonwealth v. Ford, 199 Pa. Super. 102, 184 A.2d 401 (1962) (whether or not
the police had told defendant to keep quiet); Commonwealth v. Towber, 190 Pa.
Super. 92, 152 A.2d 917 (1959) (whether or not the defendant invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination when accused).
39 In those jurisdictions which follow this procedure the jury ultimately determines all factual issues, and is charged to disregard the evidence if it finds that an
essential condition was not met. See State v. Pitts, 177 N.C. 543, 98 S.E. 767

(1919).
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the seven conditions exist.40 If the state meets this burden, the judge
should admit the evidence unless the accused can show by a preponderance
of the evidence presented at a separate hearing that there is a substantial
explanation for his conduct not involving an admission.
The one question that seems properly left solely to the jury is whether
the accusation occurred, as they must necessarily decide that the accusation
was made before using it. 41 The trial judge's determination should thus
assume, without deciding, that the accusation was made.
Once the evidence is admitted by the trial judge, the jury should hear
the same testimony in order to evaluate the weight of the evidence. It
seems unnecessary, however, to charge -thejury that they may reject affirmative findings by the judge that the circumstances called for a reply,42 or
that there was no substantial explanation for the accused's reaction consistent with his innocence. The jury should merely be charged that if
they believe that the accusation occurred, they may consider the accused's
reaction as a tacit admission of guilt. They should also be charged that
the evidence has little probative weight,43 that the defendant's conduct is
the only substantive evidence, and that the accusation is admitted "not
. . . for the purpose of proving its truth, but only to explain the conduct
of the accused in the face of it." 44

II.

ACCUSATIONS UNRELATED TO CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

The plethora of cases involving evidence of tacit admissions independent of police investigations reveals certain recurring factual situations.
Analysis of different types of statements, responses, and surrounding circumstances explores fully the considerations underlying the tacit admissions
doctrine and illustrates the thesis that no tacit admission should reach the
40 Most jurisdictions place the burden on the state.

See 4
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§ 1071, at 74 (3d ed. 1940); e.g., Arpan v. United States, 260 F.2d 649, 655 (8th
Cir. 1958) (alternative holding), 61 W. VA. L. REv. 320 (1959) ; Anderson v. State,
171 Miss. 41, 156 So. 645 (1934) ; Irving v. State, 92 Miss. 662, 47 So. 518 (1908);
State v. Sweeney, 77 N.J. Super. 512, 187 A.2d 39 (App. Div. 1962).
41 See McCoRicK, EVIDENCE § 247(b) at 530 (1954).
42 Compare Arpan v. United States, 260 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1958) (alternative
holding) (judge's determination that a reply is called for is final and not passed to
the jury), with State v. Toohey, 6 N.J. Super. 97, 70 A.2d 180 (App. Div. 1950)
(jury charged that it may reject judge's decision that a reply was likely). Toohey
was labeled "heresy" in 4 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1072 (Supp. 1962, at 54).
43
E.g., Albano v. State, 89 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1956); State v. Won, 76 Mont.
509, 524, 248 Pac. 201, 206 (1926); Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419,
32 A.2d 889 (1943). New Jersey requires such a charge even if defense counsel
fails to request it.See State v. Kobylarz, 44 N.J. Super. 250, 130 A.2d 80 (App.
Div.) (dictum), cert. denied, 24 N.J. 548, 133 A.2d 395 (1957). Jury instructions
which state that "a presumption of guilt arises from . . . [the defendant's] failure
to make a denial of the charge" are reversible error. Camper v. State, 187 Tenn.
511, 513, 216 S.W.2d 18, 19 (1948). (Emphasis added.) Accord, State v. Beckner,
197 Iowa 1252, 198 N.W. 643 (1924).
44 People v. Davis, 43 Cal. 2d 661, 672, 276 P.2d 801, 807 (1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 905 (1955); e.g., Bloomer v. State, 75 Ark. 297, 87 S.W. 438 (1905)
(alternative holding).
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jury if the defendant establishes a substantial reason for silence consistent
with his innocence. 45
A. The Declaration
1. The Nature of the Declaration
a. Direct Inculpatory Statements
The type of situation which probably persuaded courts to adopt the
tacit admissions rule, and which justifies it today, is a forthright, personal
accusation which apparently no innocent person would ignore. Suppose X
meets his good friend Y, who says, "X, you have killed my wife." X makes
no response except to turn around and leave. 46 X's response is highly
probative evidence. The compelling accusation by X's friend was direct
and dear; a third party witness to the event is perhaps less likely to misrepresent such a short, dramatic statement; and the probative value seems
to outweigh the risk of jury misuse of this hearsay accusation. Perhaps the
most significant risk is that of psychological "freezing," in which an innocent accused is so shocked by the unexpected statement, which he considers
absurd, that he does not respond. However, such "freezing" appears
unlikely. On the other hand, suppose X is excoriated by the daughter of
a person X knows, who shrieks, "Take him out of here! He said he was
going to kill . . . [my stepfather], and he has done it."

The South

Carolina Supreme Court, holding the evidence inadmissible, 47 asked, "Was
he overwhelmed by . . . the belief that nothing he could say would
45 "When any evidence is equally consistent with defendant's innocence as it is
with his guilt it should, of course, be excluded . . . ." Commonwealth v. Vallone,
347 Pa. 419, 437, 32 A.2d 889, 897 (1943) (Maxey, C.J., dissenting). Although this
standard would exclude much evidence now admitted in criminal cases, it seems
appropriate as to alleged silent admissions-the context in which Chief Justice Maxey
wrote. Wigmore states that "the general principle of Relevancy . . . tells us that
the inference of assent may safely be made only when no other explanation is equally
consistent with silence; and there is always another possible explanation-namely,
ignorance, or dissent-unless the circumstances are such that a dissent would in
ordinary experience have been expressed if the communication had not been correct." 4 WioMoRE, Evi[DuCE § 1071, at 70 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore's general approach is to admit the evidence if a tacit admission arguably occurred because the
defendant can take the stand and explain it. Id. at 74. Wigmore's basic hostility
to the privilege against self-incrimination and its emanations, De Luna v. United
States, 308 F.2d 140, 145 (5th Cir. 1962) (dictum), may be the ultimate basis for
his approach to tacit admissions.
4rThe hypothetical is taken from Brown v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 119, 134, 22
S.W. 596, 598 (1893) ; see Sumpter v. State, 45 Fla. 106, 33 So. 981 (1903) (dictum) ;
cf. State v. Hawkins, 214 N.C. 326, 199 S.E. 284 (1938) (son accused father of
killing father's wife) ; State v. Mungeon, 20 S.D. 612, 108 N.W. 552 (1906) (daughter
accused father of siring her child). Compare State v. Hodges, 381 P.2d 81, 82
(Utah 1963), in which the court noted "that at a family gathering, called for the
purpose of discussing the pregnancy, appellant failed to deny having had intercourse
with the prosecutrix." The court failed to inquire whether the defendant was ever
accused of the act, or whether he felt free to speak at the "gathering."
47State v. Goodwin, 127 S.C. 107, 114, 120 S.E. 496, 498 (1923) (defendant
was in custody for another offense) ; accord, State v. Wargo, 83 N.H. 532, 534, 145
AtI. 456, 458 (1929) (alternative holding) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Wallace, 190 N.E.2d
224 (Mass. 1963).
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avail? Under the shrieking charge of a frenzied woman, was he under a
duty, not suspected or charged with the crime at the time, to answer her
execration?" Such intemperate declarations may heighten the possibility
of "freezing," or may appear futile to deny. They should thus be excluded
since there is a substantial explanation for the accused's silence consistent
with his innocence.
Closely similar to the forthright accusation is the statement that is
more declaratory than accusatory, and which assumes the guilt of the
listener rather than challenges his innocence. Suppose Y says to his
associate X, "Tony has welched on that price-fixing agreement we worked
up with him," 48 or X's wife urges him not to rob any more banks, 49 and
X makes no response in either situation. Such declarations seem to compel
a denial from the innocent listener as much as more accusatory statements;
indeed, the risk of psychological "freezing" is arguably less in these situations since the inculpatory statement is probably less shocking to the
accused.
b. Qutestions
Suppose X makes no response when asked by Y, "Did you kill my
wife?" Although Y's question does not seem to accuse X or to assume
his guilt, it is difficult to distinguish it from Y's question, "You killed my
wife, didn't you?" or his statement, "You killed my wife." All three seem
to demand a reply from X. On -the other hand, if X is asked, "What did
you do to my wife?" no tacit admission seems possible. The accused's
silence is irrelevant because the question does not tell X what Y has in
mind. X may think, for example, that he is being accused of embarrassing
Y's wife. Suppose, on the other hand, X is asked a misleading question"Why did you kill my wife ?" 1o However impermissible such a question
would be in a courtroom, in an interpersonal situation the clarity and
gravity of the accusation underlying the question appear to outweigh its
misleading form and demand a reply from X if he is innocent of the killing.
Courts should carefully scrutinize question-type accusations, and
admit them only if they are clearly accusations of a crime. The accused's
silence to a nonaccusatory question is irrelevant; and if there is substantial
doubt that the query was inculpatory, the evidence seems too prejudicial.
c. Conversations
Some courts have held that if Y makes a statement to Z in X's
presence that inculpates X, X's failure to deny the declaration gives rise to
4S See State v. LaPlant, 149 Ore. 615, 623, 42 P.2d 158, 161 (1935) (I "didn't
think they [the police] would find it quite so soon") ; cf. Ford v. State, 34 Ark. 649
(1879) (during preliminary hearing). But see Lumpkin v. State, 125 Ga. 24, 53
S.E. 810 (1906) (in presence of officer).
49
The hypothetical was prompted by McNeill v. State, 128 Tex. Crim. 250,
80 S.W.2d 995 (1935) (dying wife urged her husband not to kill anyone else).
50 Cf. Smith v. State, 241 Ind. 665, 175 N.E.2d 27 (1961); State v. Quirk, 101
Minn. 334, 112 N.W. 409 (1907).
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a tacit admission. 51 If the prosecutor establishes that a small group was
conversing, and the defendant was part of that group, this conclusion seems
correct. However, if the accused is not a participant in the discussion, a
mere showing that he was in the same room should be insufficient, 52 since
he may not feel free to deny the accusation by interrupting the conversation.53 Moreover, even though the accused was within hearing distance,
he may not have been paying attention, since the statement was not
directed to him.M
d. Opinions
The courts have expressed radical disagreement over opinion-type
accusations. Suppose Y tells X, "I believe you killed my wife," or that Y
tells X, "I believe you are a Communist." 55 The former statement involves an imputation of guilt so personal to Y that an innocent listener
seems likely to deny it. But the latter contains a less personal opinion.
The listener's silence may equally reflect an attitude of "Believe what you
want; I know I am innocent." There is therefore a substantial reason for
his silence that is consistent with his innocence, and the evidence should be
excluded unless the statement is so personal to the accuser that it would
be inconceivable that an innocent person would ignore the opinion.5 6
Suppose Y tells X, "F has been accusing you of raping her," 5i or that
Z is told by a city health officer that "he had a report showing her house
5lE.g., Ewell v. State, 228 Md. 615, 617, 180 A.2d 857, 859 (1962) (defendant's
friend told another friend in defendant's presence that "we just yoked a man");
Thurmond v. State, 212 Miss. 36, 53 So. 2d 44 (1951) (alternative holding)
(murder victim told doctor in defendant's presence that defendant shot him); State
v. Pepo, 23 Mont. 473, 59 Pac. 721 (1900) (implying that any conversation in defendant's presence is admissible).
52 But see State v. Rawls, 2 Nott & McC. 331 (S.C. 1820).
53 State v. Kissinger, 343 Mo. 781, 786, 123 S.W.2d 81, 83 (1938) (alternative
holding) (language applies rule whether or not the accused is under arrest). Compare
People v. Pollack, 226 App. Div. 406, 235 N.Y. Supp. 553 (1929).
54 Accusations made directly to the accused provide a stronger "imputation of
guilt . . . than where the statement implicating the accused is made to other persons in the presence of the accused." People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 91, 143 N.E. 448,
454 (1924) (alternative holding). In Arpan v. United States, 260 F.2d 649 (8th
Cir. 1958), 61 W. VA. L. REv. 320 (1959), the defendant's father told the county
coroner that the defendant had admitted killing the defendant's wife. The statement was made in the defendant's home, and the defendant made no response. In
a careful analysis, the court noted that the room was sixteen feet square, and that
the conversants had moved away from the accused in an effort to have a separate
conversation. "[T]here was no thought that appellant was to listen or that he should
have any relation to the conversation. Actually, the implication would seem to be
that the opposite was in fact intended." Id. at 656. The court properly held the
declaration inadmissible. Id. at 654-57 (alternative holding).
55 Compare State v. Reed, 62 Me. 129, 142 (1874) ("suspicion of crime conveyed to the prisoner is . . . similar to a charge of having committed the crime
....
"), with State v. Foley, 144 Mo. 600, 616, 46 S.W. 733, 737 (1898) (alternative holding) (excluding accusation, "I believe . . . you would have murdered . . .
[your mother and sister for $50]"; defendant was under arrest).
Z6 The declaration, of course, must also be personal to the accused. Compare
statements made by a stranger, notes 70-71 infra and accompanying text.
57 The hypothetical is taken from People v. Page, 162 N.Y. 272, 56 N.E. 750
(1900) (dictum apparently excluding evidence) ; see McCormick v. State, 181 Wis.
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to be a bawdy house," 58 or that "everyone thinks you did it." 59 Such
declarations should never be admitted under the tacit admission rule. The
accused has no way of knowing whether the statement is true, and such
knowledge is one of the standard conditions of admissibility. 0 The
accused seems even less likely to deny "neighborhood gossip." (1 Moreover,
the accused's adoption of a declaration that other persons think the accused
guilty is irrelevant,62 and is highly prejudicial if the jury gives weight to
this opinion.
Suppose, however, that after a shooting which X has since claimed
was an accident, X was silent when told, "You shot him on purpose."
Although the statement probably reflects the subjective opinion of the
accuser, it appears to demand a denial as much as a direct accusation,
other factors remaining constant. 63 Even if there is no question as to
intent, the addition of "on purpose" to "You shot him" does not make X's
failure to deny the accusation any less probative on the issue of whether
the defendant did the shooting." Nor should the fact that the accusation
is in the form of a legal conclusion make it inadmissible, as long as the
phrase used had a commonly understood meaning; for example, "You two
have been 'living together in an unlawful state.' "65
e. Letters
The courts have agreed that accusations in unanswered letters cannot
be the basis for a tacit admission. 66 The obvious reason is that the effort
261, 194 N.W. 347 (1923)

(defendant's attorney read him a 1500-word letter by
defendant's wife accusing him of many wrongs; inadmissible); cf. Ellington v.
State, 24 Okla. Crim. 67, 215 Pac. 964 (1923) (excluded because defendant was
under arrest).
58
Bennett v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 422, 424, 239 S.W. 951, 952 (1922)
(admissible).
59 Compare Territory v. Corum, 34 Hawaii 167 (1937) (alternative holding)
(inadmissible), with State v. Reed, 62 Me. 129, 141 (1874) (holding "Everyone
suspects you, I suspect you" admissible).
60 See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
61 People v. Page, 162 N.Y. 272, 276, 56 N.E. 750, 752 (1900). Similar considerations should exclude the opinion, "The evidence against you is very convincing,"
see Territory v. Corum, 34 Hawaii 167 (1937) (alternative holding) ; cf. Weaver v.
State, 77 Ala. 26 (1884); Wolfe v. State, 173 Md. 103, 111, 194 Ati. 832, 836
(1937) (dictum) (the tacit admissions rule "should not be extended to include
the mere opinion of a third person as to the weight and significance of facts previously admitted by the . . . [defendant]"), and the prediction, "You won't get away
with this." But see Commonwealth v. Detweiler, 229 Pa. 304, 78 AtI. 271 (1910);
cf. State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622 (1961) (dictum).
62
Territory v. Corum, 34 Hawaii 167, 181 (1937) (alternative holding).
63 But cf. Davis v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 809, 265 S.W. 316 (1924).
64 See State v. Quirk, 101 Minn. 334, 112 N.W. 409 (1907).
65
A conclusion
Musfelt v. State, 64 Neb. 445, 448, 90 N.W. 237, 238 (1902).
by a doctor, "You had sexual intercourse recently," has also been admitted. See
Walker v. State, 197 Ga. 221, 28 S.E.2d 656 (1944) (defendant under arrest).
Such behavior, however, often is not criminal.
66 E.g., Packer v. United States, 106 Fed. 906 (2d Cir. 1901); State v. MacFarland, 83 N.J.L. 474, 83 Atl. 993 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912). Cf. Terrell v. State,
88 Tex. Crim. 599, 228 S.W. 240 (1921), in which the court erroneously relied on
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of writing a letter normally makes a written response unlikely. "It would
be placing a man entirely at the mercy of others, if he was bound by what
others choose to assert in addressing letters to him." '7 It has been stated
in dictum that letters are admissible if the defendant adopts them "by some
act done in pursuance of their suggestions .

.

.

."

6

In a case that

involved acts so done, however, the court stated that it was error to admit
the letter.0

f.

Statements Made by a Stranger

There are dicta in several cases that the silence of an accused to a
stranger's accusation cannot be used as a tacit admission. ° An accused
need not "enter into a controversy with every idle straggler who may choose
to accuse him to his face, nor is he bound to continue to shout his denial
of every fugitive statement tending to implicate him that may reach his
ears." 71 There is a substantial likelihood that an innocent person would
ignore such an accusation. However, when there is a face-to-face confrontation between the accuser and the accused, that likelihood seems
reduced, so that this factor alone should not exclude the evidence.
g. Invited Accusations
Suppose X asks someone, or a group, "Who committed this crime?"
It seems clear that an undenied answer accusing X should be admissible, 72
other factors being unchanged; a reply seems likely from someone who has
asked for a declaration.
this doctrine to exclude an accusation made orally by defendant's wife after she
read an inculpatory letter addressed to him. See generally 4 WIG-MORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1073 (3d ed. 1940).
The rule is less rigid in civil cases, however. See Snead v. Commonwealth,
138 Va. 787, 121 S.E. 82 (1924) (dictum).
6 7
Snead v. Commonwealth, supra note 66, at 797, 121 S.E. at 85, quoting
People v. Green, 1 Parker Crim. Rep. 11, 17 (N.Y. Oyer & Terminer 1845).
68 Commonwealth v. Eastman, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 189, 215 (1848) (dictum);
accord, Kachel v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 86, 256 S.W. 263 (1923) (dictum).
69 People v. Lee Dick Lung, 129 Cal. 491, 62 Pac. 71 (1900) (nonprejudicial
error but should be excluded in new trial granted on other grounds). A similar
result was reached in another case although the defendant had tried to destroy the
letters before trial. Poy Coon Toom v. United States, 7 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1925).
7
oE.g., State v. Young, 99 Mo. 666, 674, 12 S.W. 879, 881 (1890) (dictum)
(inadmissible); State v. Epstein, 25 R.I. 131, 55 Atl. 204 (1903) (dictum) (inadmissible). But see, e.g., People v. Todaro, 256 Mich. 427, 240 N.W. 90 (1932)
(alternative holding) (admissible); Harless v. State, 189 Tenn. 419, 225 S.W.2d
258 (1949) (dictum) (admissible).
A similar question is raised when the accusation is made by an anonymous speaker
whom the accused would know if he could identify the voice. The evidence should
be excluded, since there is obviously no face-to-face confrontation. But see Surber v.
State, 99 Ind. 71 (1884) (alternative holding).
71 People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 93, 143 N.E. 448, 455 (1924)
(dictum), apparently
paraphrasing Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 870, 878, 82 S.W. 592, 595
(1904) ; see Arpan v. United States, 260 F.2d 649, 656 (8th Cir. 1958) (dictum).
(alternative holding); State v. Hill,
72 See Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 (1884)
134 Mo. 663, 36 S.W. 223 (1896); Klepper v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 597, 223 S.W.

468 (1920).
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h. Subsequently Repudiated Accusations
Subsequent withdrawal of the declaration by the accuser should not
affect any tacit admission that may have occurred if the repudiation occurred after the defendant's responsive conduct. Whether the accusation
or its withdrawal represents the true views of the accuser is irrelevant;
the only inquiry concerns the facts the defendant knew at the time of his
reaction. Suppose, however, that the accused knew at the time he heard
the accusation that it had been repudiated by the accuser; there would then
appear to be no basis for finding a tacit admission. The silence of a listener
78
might well express his gratification that the unjust charge was withdrawn.
i. Ambiguity
Ambiguous declarations made to a defendant raise perplexing problems
to which the courts have given differing answers. This problem is exemplified by the case of Fausett v. State,74 which was an involuntary manslaughter prosecution for a shooting admitted by the defendant. Indeed,
the defendant notified the police, and they stated to him after their arrival,
but before his arrest, "Fausett, you are in a bad spot; this man . . .
probably will die . . . ." The defendant answered, "Yes, I know it. I
don't blame you fellows at all." 75 The court held that the defendant's
failure to claim that the shooting was accidental was an implied admission
that it was intentional. 76 Yet the police had not accused the defendant of
an intentional homicide; indeed their statement seems to reflect regret that
they had to arrest the defendant. The defendant's response was equally
consistent with this hypothesis: arguably he was refusing to blame the
police for arresting him, although he was innocent, because the circumstances looked suspicious. The conversation seems equally consistent with
the defendant's innocence as with his guilt, and thus should have been
excluded as evidence of a tacit admission.
73 Cf. Vaughan v. State, 7 Okla. Crim. 685, 127 Pac. 264 (1911), in which a
policeman repeated an accomplice's accusation to the defendant. The accomplice,
also present, promptly repudiated the statement; the defendant was silent. The
court excluded the statement because the defendant was under arrest, but it might
equally have relied on the repudiation ground.
74 219 Ind. 500, 510-13, 39 N.E.2d 728, 732-33 (1942).
75 Id. at 511, 39 N.E.2d at 732; see Commonwealth v. Wallace, 190 N.E.2d 224,
227 (Mass. 1963), in which the wife of the person the defendant had admitted
shooting shouted, "Let me at him; I could kill you." Since the only issue was
whether the shooting was intentional, the accusation seems irrelevant. The court
held the evidence improperly admitted.
76 Since the defendant testified at trial, the evidence may have been admitted
solely to impeach his credibility as prior inconsistent conduct, and not as substantive evidence of guilt. See generally 3 WIGMORE, EVmsEncn § 1042 (3d ed. 1940).
But the court draws no such distinction and appears to admit the accused's response
as substantive evidence of a tacit admission. Fausett v. State, 219 Ind. 500, 510-13,
39 N.E.2d 728, 732-33 (1942). But cf. People v. Reese, 33 Cal. Rptr. 561, 563
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (alternative holding) (accused need not "disclose his alibi or
any other defense" in denying an accusation).
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A similar problem has arisen with vulgar declarations that the defendant committed a sex crime. Thus, prior -to an incest prosecution, the
defendant's pregnant daughter had said to him, "You damned old black
son of a bitch, look how you have -treated me." 77 The court reversed the
conviction largely because there was no showing that the defendant heard
the statement. This result seems proper whether or not he heard it, as
obviously the accusation could have related to an infinite variety of situations.78 Suppose, however, that prior to a seduction prosecution the girl's
aunt tells the defendant that they need "a marriage license and a preacher."
The declaration might be dismissed by the defendant as absurd gossip or
as no charge of intercourse; but, if the accusation occurred after the defendant knew the girl's family planned a criminal prosecution, the meaning
behind the statement seems clear and apparently calls for a denial.7 9 The
test should be whether the defendant has a substantial contention that he
did not understand that he was being charged with criminal behavior.

j. DeclarationsNot Apparently Incriminatory
A number of cases have involved accusations not of conduct criminal
in itself, but of conduct which if otherwise established would be probative
of guilt. Suppose X was accused, after his wife was killed, of having had
an unhappy marriage, 0 or the wife of a contractor who is accused of
embezzling funds states in his presence that he bought a new car for his
son-in-law. 8' The courts have generally tended to admit the failure to
respond to such charges as tacit admissions that the statements were true.
However, the evidence should be excluded unless the 'statement appeared
to be incriminatory at the time it was made. Otherwise the motive for
denying the charge is so reduced that the risk of prejudice seems to outweigh the probative value of the accused's silence.
77 Sauls
78 In

v. State, 30 Tex. Ct. App. R. 496, 497, 17 S.W. 1066 (1891).

People v. Frugoli, 334 Ill.
324, 334, 166 N.E. 129, 133 (1929), while
answering police questions, an accomplice said that the accused "was with me on
that robbery and on four other robberies." The court properly excluded the evidence,
holding alternatively that the reference to other crimes made the statement inadmissible, and that the accused might have been guilty .of this crime and not guilty
of the others, or vice-versa.
79 In the actual case, the accusation followed a preliminary hearing, and the
court admitted the evidence in a five-to-two decision. Knight v. State, 64 Tex.
Crim. 541, 571-73, 144 S.W. 967, 984-85 (1912). The dissent contended that the
aunt could have thought marriage desirable "without entertaining the slightest
idea that appellant was guilty of any wrong towards prosecutrix, or that he ever
had intercourse with her, or that he ever seduced her . . . ." Id. at 587, 144 S.W.
at 992. The preliminary hearing seems to belie this contention, however. Cf.
Robinson v. State, 149 Ark. 1, 231 S.W. 2 (1921) (alternative holding) (excluded).
Compare State v. Hendrick, 232 N.C. 447, 61 S.E.2d 349 (1950) (dictum) (doubting
admissibility).
80 See State v. Cruse, 112 Kan. 486, 212 Pac. 81 (1923) (admissible); cf.
Williams v. State, 16 S.W. 816 (Ark. 1891) (admitting accusation of bad feeling
and threats between defendant and deceased); Manna v. State, 179 Wis. 384, 401,
192 N.W. 1160, 166-67 (1923) (admitting accusation that defendant had been "fooling
with" deceased's wife).
81 People v. Dziobecki. 3 App. Div. 2d 493, 162 N.Y.S.2d 597, rev'd per curiam,
3 N.Y.2d 997, 147 N.E.2d 478, 169 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1957) (excluded).
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Suppose Y tells X "You were at the bank at 10 a.m. today." 82 The
evidence would seem admissible only if X knew that a crime had occurred
at the designated time and place.8 3 Suppose that in an adultery prosecution the state seeks to introduce evidence that the children of X's alleged
mistress called X "Papa." 84 It would seem that this popular term of
patriarchy does not dearly connote paternity, and that there is little motive
to reject the label since X may not know that he is being accused of a crime.
A few courts have admitted statements made in the defendant's presence that he had no discernible motive to deny. Suppose that after a shooting which X admitted a friend came over, put his hand on X's shoulder, and
said, "We all know it was an accident." 8 It would seem that X's silence
to the statement tends to show nothing; both innocent and guilty men
would probably remain silent with equal facility. Nor is a motive to deny
present if the statement seemed flippant to the inculpated listener.8 6
Different considerations should apply, however, if X is silent when his
brother makes a settlement offer to Y who is threatening to prosecute X
for stealing; 87 the result should depend on whether the offer would be
admissible if made by the defendant himself. 88 His silent presence during
the offer leaves little room for doubt that he acquiesced in the offer, although
not necessarily that he tacitly portrayed a consciousness of guilt.
82 See Smith v. State, 158 Ark. 487, 250 S.W. 527 (1923) (alternative holding)
(admissible); Davis v. State, 141 Ark. 170, 216 S.W. 292 (1919) (dictum) (admissible) ; cf. State v. Rosa, 72 N.J.L. 462, 62 Atl. 695 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905), in
which it was stated in the defendant's presence that the defendant had speculated
on what he would do if convicted. The court admitted the evidence.
83 Cf. Mitchell v. State, 103 Tex. Crim. 92, 279 S.W. 1112 (1926), 5 TEXAS
L. REv. 215 (1927). Compare People v. Friedman, 205 N.Y. 161, 98 N.E. 471
(1912), in which the defendant sat mute while his only accomplice denied shooting a
victim of their crime, which they admitted. The court held admissibility improper.
This result seems correct, since it is doubtful that the defendant would realize that
he had been accused of the shooting by necessary implication. See also People v.
Smith, 172 N.Y. 210, 221-25, 231-34, 64 N.E. 814, 816-17, 819-21 (1902) (alternative
holding) (suspect rebuffed by his wife; excluded); Humphrey v. State, 47 Tex.
Crim. 262, 83 S.W. 187 (1904) (excluded fact that defendant's wife cried on learning
he was suspected).
84 State v. Kemp, 87 N.C. 538 (1882) (admissible as a tacit admission of both
male and female defendants). But see Commonwealth v. Coyne, 115 Pa. Super. 23,
25, 175 Atl. 291-92 (1934) (apparently rejecting evidence that defendant, on trial
for maintaining a gambling, house, had been called "one of the bosses" inside the
establishment) ; cf. Robinson v. State, 235 Miss. 100, 103, 108 So. 2d 583, 584 (1959).
Robinson was an uxoricide prosecution, prior to which the defendant's stepson said
in his presence, "Daddy shot mother dear." The court excluded the evidence largely
because of testimony that the child addressed his natural father as "Daddy."
85 State v. Gilliam, 60 N.M. 129, 132, 288 P.2d 675, 677 (1955) (admissible).
Compare State v. Morton, 107 N.C. 890, 12 S.E. 113 (1890), holding that a witness
who testifies that the defendant is guilty may be impeached by showing that the
witness had previously been silent when a third person was accused. See also
State v. Burton, 94 N.C. 947 (1886) ; note 76 supra.
86 But see Ewell v. State, 228 Md. 615, 623, 180 A.2d 857, 862 (1962)
(admitting
a statement characterized by the dissent as a "boast of a criminal-minded teenager") ;
Commonwealth v. Manuszak, 155 Pa. Super. 309, 312, 38 A.2d 355, 357 (1944)
("What do you say we flip a coin to see who will take the rap?" held admissible).
87 See Territory v. Harrington, 17 N.M. 62, 121 Pac. 613 (1912)
(admissible).
Compare Commonwealth v. Twombly, 319 Mass. 464, 66 N.E.2d 362 (1946) (excluding a response offering to accept probation because of previous denial); State v.
McKenzie, 184 Wash. 32, 49 P.2d 1115 (1935) (admitting an accusation when the
defendant countered by asking what his penalty would be if he confessed).
88 See generally 4 WIGM RE, EvmENCE § 1061, at 31-32 (3d ed. 1940).
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2. The Timing of the Declaration
a. Prior to the Crime
An occasional accusation takes place prior to the crime, rather than
subsequently, and the courts have tended to admit them. Suppose that Y
tells Z in X's presence that Y and X "plan to rob the bank the following
evening." 89 Although arguably a boast, this statement would seem admissible if X remains silent. Suppose, however, that a subsequent murder
victim tells a witness in the defendant's presence that the defendant "was
mad at him about something-he did not know what it was .... Y) 90
There would seem to be little motive to deny such a statement; it in no way
incriminated the defendant. Courts should use great caution in admitting
accusations occurring before the crime charged, since they present a less
compelling situation to the listener, who may well dismiss them as absurd.
b. During the Crime
Ejaculated utterances by bystanders concerning a striking event are
normally admissible under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule;I)
if they incriminate the defendant, however, the prosecution may seek to
show that the defendant failed to respond, so that the state may obtain a
charge on a tacit admission and argue to the jury that one occurred. 92 They
should be admissible unless the accused was distracted by some other
activity at the time of the declaration. 93 A significant prejudicial aspect
of this type of evidence is not present because the hearsay statement is
already admissible as a contemporaneous or excited utterance, and the
showing of the defendant's reaction does not carry with it otherwise excludable hearsay. But, the doubt that a reply is likely if the accused was
distracted should preclude both argument and charge on the tacit admission
theory because the accused's silence is irrelevant.
B. The Response
1. Negative Answers
If the defendant denies an inculpatory statement, both the statement
and the denial are inadmissible 9 4 because there is no rational basis for
89 See People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal. 2d 105, 114, 194 P.2d 681, 686, cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948) (admissible); Williams v. State, 42 Ark. 380, 382 (1883)
(alternative holding) (admissible, but worth "little as a tacit admission").
90 In the actual case the victim also said that the defendant had threatened to
kill him. The court admitted the evidence. LaGrone v. State, 61 Tex. Crim. 170,
173, 135 S.W. 121, 122 (191.1). Compare Manna v. State, 179 Wis. 384, 401, 192
N.W. 160, 166-67 (1923).
91 See UNIFORA RULE OF EVIDENCE 63 (4).
92

See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 300 Mass. 45, 50-51, 13 N.E.2d 939, 942,
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 565 (1938), approving this practice. Contra, Commonwealth v.
Roberts, 108 Mass. 296 (1871) -(dictum).
93
But see Character v. State, 212 Miss. 30, 53 So. 2d 41 (1951).
94
E.g., Amezaga v. United States, 296 Fed. 915 (5th Cir. 1924); State v.
Levitt, 278 Mo. 372, 213 S.W. 108 (1919) (alternative holding) ; Low v. State, 108
Tenn. 127, 65 S.W. 401 (1901) ; cases cited note 17 supra.
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finding that a tacit admission occurred. Moreover, the jury might give
substantive weight to the accusation and ignore the denial. 9 5 However, a
denial by the defendant does not operate to exclude an accusation that is
substantively admissible on other grounds.9
The courts have not always agreed on what constitutes a denial. Suppose X replies to his accuser, "You are crazy," 97 or merely shakes his
head.98 Both responses seem to be fairly clear denials and should suffice
to exclude the evidence. Massachusetts, however, has held that the following reactions do not constitute denials: she "was out of her head, she did
not know what she was talking about"; 19 and "that is his opinion." 100
Such a narrow view of denials makes admissibility depend on the accused's
fortuitous choice of words rather than his clearly expressed intent, and, in
Professor Morgan's words, goes "a long way toward making the implied
admission a trick or catch of . . . police procedure." 101 Morgan's

critique applies with equal force to nonpolice situations.
2. Equivocal or Evasive Answers
The tacit admission rule may also be invoked if the accused responds
not with silence but with words somewhere between a denial and an
express acquiescence.10 2 In some respects, evasive or equivocal responses
are "more reliable evidence of guilt than . . . silence," because such
action demonstrates that there was no physical or psychological barrier to
95 People v. Wilson, 298 Ill. 257, 259, 131 N.E. 609, 611 (1921). The only
substantive evidence, of course, is the defendant's reaction. Watt v. People, 126
111. 9, 29, 18 N.E. 340, 348 (1888).
96 See Commonwealth v. Zaidon, 253 Mass. 600, 149 N.E. 550 (1925), admitting
a denied accusation apparently under the res .estae exception to the hearsay rule.
97 People v. Wilson, 298 Ill. 257, 260, 131 N.E. 609, 611 (1921)
(excluded);
see People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 81, 94, 143 N.E. 448, 456, 457 (1924) (alternative
holding) (excluded) ; cf. Watt v. People, 126 Ill. 9, 27-29, 18 N.E. 340, 348 (1888).
Compare Commonwealth v. Graham, 279 Mass. 466, 467, 181 N.E. 506 (1932)
(admitted response, "I must have been crazy if I did it.").
98 State v. Bauers, 25 Wash. 2d 825, 839-43, 172 P.2d 279, 287-89 (1946)
(admitting such evidence).
99 Commonwealth v. Hamel, 264 Mass. 564, 569, 163 N.E. 168, 170 (1928)
(defendant under arrest) ; see Commonwealth v. Curry, 341 Mass. 50, 166 N.E.2d 714
(1960). But see Commonwealth v. Sams, 62 Pa. D. & C. 79, 87 (Lawrence County
Ct 1947) (he has "a wonderful imagination"; evidence excluded); State v.
Farnsworth, 383 P.2d 489 (Utah 1963) (alternative holding), in which the defendant, accused of burglary, replied that "the only thing they could 'get' him for was
possession of stolen property." The court said it "could be construed as a denial"
and excluded the evidence. Id. at 490. See also People v. Whitehorn, 383 P.2d 783,
32 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (not prejudicial error).
100 Commonwealth v. Locke, 335 Mass. 106, 116, 138 N.E.2d 359, 366 (1956)
(held "somewhat equivocal"; defendant under arrest).
101 Maguire, Adoptive Admissions in Massachusetts, Mass. L.Q., May 1929, pp.
62,78.0 2
1
A distinction may be drawn between evasive and equivocal answers. The
former avoid the thrust of the accusation, while the latter meet the declaration in a
way permitting an inference either of guilt or innocence. Brody, Admissions Implied
From Silence, Evasion and Equivocation in Massachusetts Criminal Cases, 42 B.U.L.
Ruv. 46, 48 (1962). "Mind your own business," see State v. Plym, 43 Minn. 385, 45
N.W. 848 (1890), would be an evasive reaction, whereas "Are you sure?", see People
v. Stella, 344 Ill. 589, 176 N.E. 909 (1931), would seem merely equivocal.
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a response from the accused. 10 On the other hand, some evasive responses
manifest ignorance, or the accused's intention not to be drawn into a battle
of words, and thus should be inadmissible.
The procedure for determining the admissibility of alleged tacit admissions involving affirmative responses should be similar to that suggested
when silence is the only response. Although an affirmative response is
subject to fewer interpretations than silence, which may reflect contempt
or ignorance, the prejudicial accusation is still presented to the jury. It
thus seems appropriate for the trial judge to determine whether an admission occurred and thereafter permit the jury to determine whether the
accusation took place.
a. Answers Manifesting Ignorance
There is generally no basis for inferring that a tacit admission occurred
if the accused says he does not remember whether or not the accusation is
true; 104 "I don't know anything about it," 105 or "I don't remember any
such incident." Suppose, however, that Y asks X whether he used a particular gun in a given crime, and X answers, "I don't remember." Since
the response indicates that he has forgotten only one part of the crime,
the evidence should be admissible. 10 6
b. Answers Tending To Admit the Accusation
Not infrequently an accusation will provoke a response that comes
very close to an express acquiescence. Such answers might be treated as
express admissions, but the tacit admission rule is invoked because the
meaning of the response is clearer when the trier of fact hears the accusation. Suppose that X responds to an accusation of shooting Y by saying,
"He wasn't hurt much"; 107 or that his accuser "knew what he was talking
10

3 Brody, supra note 102, at 49. Compare text accompanying note 31 supra.
See People v. Chavez, 50 Cal. 2d 778, 790-92, 329 P.2d 907, 915-16 (1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 993 (1959) (error held nonprejudicial; defendant under
arrest); Dykeman v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 807, 113 S.E.2d 867 (1960) ; 4 WIGMORE,
EvIDENcE § 1072(e) (Supp. 1962, at 55). A shrug of the shoulders should bring
the same result. Cf. People v. Cascone, 185 N.Y. 317, 323-30, 78 N.E. 287, 289-91
(1906) (under arrest).
105 Williams v. State, 42 Ark. 380 (1883)
(alternative holding); see State v.
Fleming, 354 Mo. 31, 188 S.W.2d 12 (1945) (alternative holding), excluding the
evidence when a rape suspect stated that he did not know the girl after she accused
him. But see Commonwealth v. Hebert, 264 Mass. 571, 578, 163 N.E. 189, 191
(1928) ("I have no recollection of ever seeing this woman" held admissible).
106
In State v. Jackson, 369 S.W._d 199 (Mo. 1963), one issue in defendant's
conviction of attempted burglary was what felony he intended to commit. He was
asked by the police whether he intended to rob or rape his victim. He answered
that he did not know. Such a response is properly admissible as an implied admission
on the question of breaking and entering, but seems irrelevant to the issue of his
intent. Cf. Jones v. State, 228 Miss. 296, 87 So. 2d 573, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 937
(1956).
Compare State v. Thorne, 43 Wash. 2d 47, 58, 260 P.2d 331, 337 (1953)
(admitting the response, "I don't know how I could have done it").
7
10 Knight v. State, 114 Ga. 48, 50, 39 S.E. 928-29 (1901) ; see State v. Butler,
258 Mo. 430, 436, 167 S.W. 509, 510 (1914) (admitting the response, "Lord, Lord,
what have I done") ; People v. LaBarbara, 159 Misc. 177, 179, 287 N.Y. Supp. 257,
104
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about, and if he wanted to tell it, it was all right." L08 Nor does the
response, "What did they do to you to make you tell it?" 1109 seem very
different. The significant probative quality of such implicit acquiescence
in the accusation seems to outweigh the risk of prejudice.
A similar result should obtain if the accused denies a minor part of the
assertion and ignores the rest.110 Suppose Y tells X, "You spoke at the
Communist rally last night and then went downtown," to which X responds,
"I did not go downtown." Such a negative pregnant seems to acquiesce
in the major thrust of the declaration."' A different result seems proper,
however, if X answers, "I did no such thing."
c. Nonverbal Responses
Suppose the accused's response is a sneer," 2 a laugh,"8 or tears. 114
The courts have usually admitted such responses. Because of the near260 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (admitting "what are you going to do about it?" after an
initial denial). The fact that the situation may have occurred after arrest or after
the commencement of an official investigation is no reason to exclude such quasiadmissions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lucas, 332 Mass. 594, 126 N.E.2d 804
(1955); City of Raton v. Cowan, 67 N.M. 463, 357 P.2d 52 (1960); Moran v.
State, 11 Ohio C.C.R. 464, 5 Ohio Cir. Dec. 235 (Cuyahoga County Cir. Ct),
aff'd -mem., 51 Ohio St. 616 (1894).
In People v. Bernstein, 171 Cal. App. 2d 279, 340 P.2d 299 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959), a psychiatrist was suspected of statutory rape. The court admitted recordings of two conversations that occurred when the girl called the psychiatrist on the
phone. Excerpts are:
[Girl:] My folks know that you and I had sexual intercourse ....
[Psychiatrist:] Don't worry. There's nothing to indicate anything ....
[Girl:] . . . I don't know how they found out.
[Psychiatrist:] Don't worry, they haven't found out anything yet ....
[Girl:] . . . It happened, you know that and I know that, but how are
we going to keep everybody else from knowing it?
[Psychiatrist:] Nobody knows.
Id. at 282-83, 340 P.2d at 300-01. Compare People v. Davis, 43 Cal. 2d 661, 669-72,
276 P.2d 801, 805-07 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955).
108 People v. Evenow, 355 Ill. 451, 455, 189 N.E. 368, 370 (1934) ; see Gillespie
v. State, 215 Miss. 380, 61 So. 2d 150 (1952) ; Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128,
16 A.2d 401 (1940) ; Tillman v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 46, 37 S.E.2d 768 (1946).
109 Cawthon v. State, 71 Ga. App. 497, 502, 31 S.E.2d 64, 67 (1944) ; see Ford v.
State, 34 Ark. 649 (1879). On the other hand, "What did they do to you to make you
say it?" seems in substance to be a denial.
110 See Commonwealth v. Helfman, 258 Mass. 410, 155 N.E. 448 (1927) (admitting denial of part of police accusation).
1I See Turner v. State, 17 Ala. App. 514, 85 So. 849 (1920).
112 Commonwealth v. Karmendi, 328 Pa. 321, 335, 195 Atl. 62, 68 (1937)
(dictum) (admissible).
113 Flandell v. State, 31 Ala. App. 520, 19 So. 2d 401, cert. denied, 246 Ala.
122, 19 So. 2d 404 (1944); State v. Hill, 134 Mo. 663, 36 S.W. 223 (1896); cf.
Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A.2d 401 (1940) (the accused grinned).
Compare Barton v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 786, 43 S.W.2d 55 (1931)
(either
remained silent or walked away) ; Commonwealth v. Gangi, 243 Mass. 341, 344, 137
N.E. 643, 644 (1923) ("started and changed color a good deal") ; People v. Cascone,
185 N.Y. 317, 323-30, 78 N.E. 287, 289-91 (1906) (shrugged shoulders); State v.
Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 (1879) (picked up accusing young daughter, smiled, and
held her).
14 See People v. Banos, 209 Cal. App. 2d 754, 26 Cal. Rptr. 127 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1962).
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impossibility of determining the meaning of the reaction, such responses
might well be treated as equivalent to silence, with the proposed higher
standard of admissibility. Although the reaction indicates that the accused
heard and probably understood the declaration, it neither indicates that a
reply was called for, nor that the accused was free to assert his innocence.
d. Sudden Silence
Several cases have raised the problem of an evasive reply, other than
a denial, 1 5 which is followed by silence when the inculpatory statement is
reasserted in the same conversation. The question arose strikingly in a
rape prosecution: the accused, who was under arrest, was first silent when
charged by the woman, but then stated that she "was willing." She then
jumped up and shouted at him in tears, "Why did you have to choke me
if I . . . consented?"

The suspect made no answer.

The court prop-

erly thought the entire incident admissible." 6 The initial evasive or
equivocal response shows that there was no deterrent to a response from
the accused; and when his listener immediately rejects his evasive response
and he falls silent, it seems likely that he failed to adhere to his initial
response solely because it was false. The courts have properly accepted
such evidence, :" 7 even if the accused was under arrest.":8 The conversational interchange should be uninterrupted, however, or these considerations are inapplicable--it is the immediacy of the accuser's rejoinder that
compels an additional answer from the accused and demonstrates that he
is still free to respond. However, if the accused's initial response manifests
his deliberate refusal to discuss the incident, his subsequent silence should
be excluded.
C. CircumstantialFactorsImpeding a Reply
1. Physical Circumstances
a. Distance and Preoccupation
The courts have usually excluded evidence of alleged tacit admissions
if the defendant is in a different room than the accuser."19 Not only is it
115 The effect of a denial upon the admissibility of subsequent conduct is considered in notes 195-97 infra and accompanying text.
116 State v. Sorge, 125 NJ.L. 445, 447-48, 15 A.2d 776, 777 (Ct. Err. & App.)
(dictum), affirming 123 N.J.L. 532, 10 A.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
117 See People v. Banos, 209 Cal. App. 2d 754, 26 Cal. Rptr. 127 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962) ; State v. Lovell, 235 Mo. 343, 138 S.W. 523 (1911); State v. Gentry, 228
N.C. 643, 46 S.E.2d 863, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 818 (1948); Klepper v. State, 87
Tex. Crim. 597, 223 S.W. 468 (1920) ; cf. Tucker v. State, 187 A.2d 429 (Del. 1963).
118 See Territory v. Buick, 27 Hawaii 28, 47-50 (1923); State v. Bell, 129 La.
550, 56 So. 504 (1911) (apparently arrested); cf. State v. Brown, 209 Minn. 478,
296 N.W. 582 (1941) (in presence of police but prior to arrest). But see State v.
Hester, 137 S.C. 145, 175, 134 S.E. 885, 895 (1925) (under arrest).
19 Accord, Morse v. State, 27 Ala. App. 447, 173 So. 875 (1937) (alternative
holding); People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222, 90 N.E.2d 48 (1949) (alternative holding);
Aidt v. State, 2 Ohio C.C.R. 18 (Crawford County Ct. 1886) (alternative holding).
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unlikely that the accused heard the declaration, it is often doubtful that he
was paying attention, or he may have had to go into the next room to make
his denial heard. Courts should not only insist that accused and accuser
be in the same room, but should also inquire into the relative positions of the
parties to insure that a response was likely.1 ° No set rule as to distance
seems possible, 121 as a whisper may be inaudible at five feet while a shout
is easily heard fifty feet away, but as the space between the speaker and
accused increases, the likelihood of a reply decreases if other factors remain
the same.
The accused is also less likely to interrupt himself and reply if he is
preoccupied. Courts, however, have sometimes ignored indications that
22
the accused's attention may have been diverted.'
b. Physical Disability

It would be untenable to admit accusations when the accused is
physically incapable of making a response. The cases admitting evidence
of alleged tacit admissions by drunk defendants 'm may well reflect the
presence of a small degree of intoxication rather than dissent from this
proposition. The evidence should also be excluded if the accused is
significantly affected by drugs.1' 4 Clearly the degree of intoxication or
Contra, State v. Casale, 148 Me. 312, 92 A.2d 718 (1952)

(two rooms away);

State v. Finley, 118 N.C. 1161, 24 S.E. 495 (1896). Compare State v. Baruth, 47
Wash. 283, 284-85, 91 Pac. 977, 980-82 (1907) (alternative holding) (door into
defendant's adjacent room was open at first, then dosed; court admitted only statements made while the door was open).
M20See the careful analysis in Arpan v. United States, 260 F.2d 649, 654-57
(8th 2Cir.
1958) (alternative holding), 61 W. VA. L. Rv. 320 (1959), note 54 supra.
1
'
Compare Bullock v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 799, 45 S.W.2d 449 . (1932)
(excluding evidence when defendant was perhaps one hundred feet away), with
LaGrone v. State, 61 Tex. Crim. 170, 135 S.W. 121 (1911) (admitting evidence when
distance was fifteen feet).
122 See Odum v. State, 183 Ga. 854, 190 S.E. 25 (1937)
(.etble); State v.
Finley, 118 N.C. 1161, 24 S.E. 495 (1896) (semble) ; note 93 supra and accompanying text; cf. State v. Sharbino, 194 La. 709, 719, 194 So. 756, 759 (1940), in which
the dying accuser "had a fit" as he finished the statement. The court admitted the
evidence apparently without considering the possibility that the "fit!' made response
highly unlikely. But see Myers v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 597, 137 N.E. 547, 549 (1922)
(alternative holding), which excluded an accusation partly because the accused was
"nervous and greatly excited, . . . and [perhaps] crying and hysterical."
Physical activity may be more likely than mental concentration to deter a
response. Compare State v. Rawls, 2 Nott & McC. 331 (S.C. 1820) (playing cards).
123 See State v. Graham, 176 Minn. 164, 222 N.W. 909 (1929); Thurmond v.
State, 212 Miss. 36, 53 So. 2d 44 (1951) (alternative holding) (no objection at
trial) ; State v. Martin, 182 N.C. 846, 109 S.E. 74 (1921) ; State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio
L. Abs. 413, 112 N.E.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1951); Oliver v. State, 208 Tenn. 692, 696,
348 S.W.2d 325, 326 (1961)
("pretty well intoxicated"); Lovworn v. State, 192
Tenn. 336, 340, 241 S.W.2d 419, 420 (1951) ("drunk . . . but . . . he knew what
was going on"). But see Bloomer v. State, 75 Ark. 297, 87 S.W. 438 (1905)
(alternative holding) ; People v. Bracamonte, 197 Cal. App. 2d 385, 17 Cal. Rptr. 62
(Dist Ct. App. 1961) (dictum) ; State v. Sweeney, 77 N.J. Super. 512, 187 A.2d 39
(App. Div. 1962) (alternative holding) (unable to walk unaided) ; People v. Allen,
300 N.Y. 222, 90 N.E.2d 48 (1949) (alternative holding) (could not give a coherent

story).

124 See People v. Bracamonte, supra note 123 (holding). But see Commonwealth v. Gomino, 200 Pa. Super. 160, 171, 188 A.2d 784, 789 (1963), in which the
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stupefaction should determine whether a reply was likely, and if the accused
had taken drugs or liquor the evidence should be presumptively inadmissible
unless the state can demonstrate that his understanding and capacity were
not significantly impaired.
The courts have shown a rare unanimity, however, in excluding accusations made to a person who was severely ill or injured. 25 If the
accused is bedridden, moreover, courts should be sensitive to the risk that
26
his faculties for comprehension or speech have been impaired.
2. Psychological Circumstances
a. Dying Accusations
Virtually without exception, courts have admitted accusations made
by a dying person to an accused as implied admissions..2 7 However, no
tacit admission is likely unless it appears "that the accused not only had an
opportunity to speak for himself, but was in a position where it would have
been fit, suitable and proper for him to speak." 12 8 The courts have generally been insensitive to the effect of the "natural implication of hushing from
the hovering presence of death" 128 upon the likelihood of a response. Is it
defendant had apparently "injected himself with a narcotic prior to his arrest. The
officers testified that he appeared to be somewhat under the influence of a drug but
that he was coherent and talked sensibly at his home." Relying on the Pennsylvania
practice of letting the jury decide whether a tacit admission was likely, see notes
37-38 supra, the court admitted the evidence for a jury finding of whether the
accused was too drugged to respond.
125 See People v. Briggs, 58 Cal. 2d 385, 408, 374 P.2d 257, 272, 24 Cal. Rptr.
417, 432 (1962) (accused on a stretcher in an ambulance, "in a questionable mental
and physical condition . . . drooling and incoherent"); Mumford v. State, 70 Fla.
424. 426, 70 So. 399 (1915), in which the accused, "though in the same room with
her husband [accuser], was lying down upon a bed, with her head full of shot,
blinded by blood and screaming lustily .

.

.

.";

Tate v. State, 95 Miss. 138, 48

So. 13 (1909) (alternative holding) (shot in the arm); State v. Butler, 185 N.C.
625, 115 S.E. 889 (1923) ; State v. Epstein, 25 R.I. 131, 55 Atl. 204 (1903) (alternative holding) (accused had fallen twenty-five feet; excluded also because he was
arrested).
1261n Cook v. People, 56 Colo. 477, 487, 138 Pac. 756, 759 (1914)
(alternative
holding), the court noted that the accused was bedridden as one reason for excluding
the evidence. But cf. People v. Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 263 Pac. 226 (1928).
27
E.g., Simmons v. State, 129 Ala. 41, 29 So. 929 (1901); Davis v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 809, 265 S.W. 316 (1924); Commonwealth v. Brown, 264 Pa. 85,
107 Atl. 676 (1919); McNeill v. State, 128 Tex. Crim. 250, 80 S.W.2d 995 (1935).
In a number 9f cases, the accused was under arrest and had been taken by the
police to the bedside of the dying victim. E.g., Roberts v. State, 94 Fla. 149, 113
So. 726 (1927); People v. Kregger, 335 Mich. 457, 465-67, 56 N.W.2d 349, 353-54
(1953), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 929 (1958).
128People v. Ross, 325 Ill. 417, 423, 156 N.E. 303, 305 (1927).
(Emphasis
added.)
129The phrase appears in Arpan v. United States, 260 F.2d 649, 656 (8th Cir.
1958), 61 W. VA.L. REv.320 (1959).
Thus, in Hoover v. State, 91 Ohio St. 41, 47, 109 N.E. 626, 628 (1914),
the accused, suspected of uxoricide, remained silent while his mother-in-law accused
him of the murder of his dying wife, who seemed to agree with the accusation.
Once in the next room, the accused denied his guilt. The court admitted the
evidence over his contention that he had thought it "unseemly" to deny an accusation that his mother-in-law had put into his wife's mouth, the court saying such
factors go to the weight and not the competency of the evidence.
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reasonable to expect an accused to contradict the whispered, halting words
of a dying man? At its extreme, such a situation would seem to forbid
comment by a listener.
The possible admissibility of the statement as a dying declaration is
relevant to the tacit admission question. If, like verbal acts 130 and res
gestae statements,' 31 the accusation is admissible as substantive evidence
under another exception to the hearsay rule, the principal hearsay-prejudice
factor of most tacit admissions disappears. The presence of death, however,
seems to be so substantial a factor preventing a reply that, even when the
deceased's statement is independently admissible, evidence of the accused's
13 2
reaction to it should be excluded as irrelevant to the issue of his guilt.
On the other hand, if the accusation occurred when the accused was unaware that his accuser was near death, or if the accused had been conversing with his accuser prior to the accusation in a manner showing that
he felt free to contradict him, 1' the presence of death would not seem
likely to deter a denial.
b. Relation of Accused and Accuser
Unlike their treatment of dying accusations, the courts have been more
sensitive to interpersonal psychological factors in the relationship between
34
speaker and accused that may prevent a denial. As with confessions '
and express admissions, the risk is always present that pathological factors
will prompt the accused to remain silent to an accusation he knows to be
false. Such factors are difficult to assess in any given case, and thus
should not exclude tacit admissions any more than they exclude confessions. Since the catalyst of a tacit admission is an accusation, however,
a factor not present in confessions-the psychological relation between the
accused and accuser-may prevent a denial.
The courts have tended to admit intrafamilial accusations. One case
excluded a wife's silence when her husband accused her of selling whisky,
however, stating that when a wife is in her husband's presence she acts "in
obedience to his will or under his coercion . . . . " 13
This premise
seems to have little validity in the modern era of feminine emancipation.
The concept of deference has also been used to exclude an accusation by
an angry wife made to her husband, the court noting that "ordinarily the
wise husband attempts to soothe and placate his irate spouse, rather than
to question her statements, however wide of the truth they may be." '
130 See Wilson v. United States, 313 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
131 See text accompanying note 91 supra.
132 See People v. Mleczko, 298 N.Y. 153, 81 N.E.2d 65 (1948) (alternative

holding) (statements admissible, but conviction reversed in part because defendant's
silence when under arrest was admitted).
133 As in State v. Fisher, 54 Mont. 211, 169 Pac. 282 (1917).
134 See generally McCoRMICK, EVIDENcE § 109, at 225-26 (1954).
13 5 Braxton v. State, 17 Ala. App. 167, 169, 82 So. 657, 659 (1919).
136 Riley v. State, 107 Miss. 600, 607, 65 So. 882, 883 (1914). But see Rice v.
State, 49 Tex. Crim. 569, 575-76, 94 S.W. 1024, 1027-28 (1906) (dictum).
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Accusations by parents,137 siblings,' 38 and children ' 39 have generally been
admitted. This result seems proper because persons normally feel free
to speak to their relatives, in spite of the risk that psychic factors tending
to "freeze" denials may be greater between members of the same family,
a consideration which in any given case might be argued to the judge.
The supposed superiority of the accused over his accuser has at times
been used to exclude tacit admissions, perhaps because silence in such
cases may be "more salutary than self-incriminating," 140 and reflect "silent
contempt" 141 rather than acquiescence. "No man will be as likely to reply
to an accusation made by a disreputable character as he will to an
accusation made by a reputable character." 142 The problem has been
strikingly presented by cases in which a very small child, often the accused's offspring, makes an accusation. Although one case stated that a
parent is unlikely to "contradict . . . the prattle of his own little [four-

year-old] child," 143 most of the cases have admitted such accusations. 44
The futility of arguing with a baby is obvious, yet the presence of other
persons may well prompt a denial by an innocent accused. Also, most of
the cases have involved accusations personal and important to the child,
'37 See Page v. State, 208 Miss. 347, 44 So. 2d 459 (1950)
(father) ; Musfelt v.
State, 64 Neb. 445, 90 N.W. 237 (1902) (mother); cf. id. (future mother-in-law).
But cf. Slattery v. People, 76 Ill. 217, 221 (1875) (excluding accusation by fatherin-law because the accused had promised to "be on his good behavior" before he
visited him).
138 See Page v. State, supra note 137 (sister); State v. Wilson, 205 N.C. 376,
171 S.E. 338 (1933) (brother).
(dictum);
'39 See, e.g., State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 94 S.E.2d 915 (1956)
Phelan v. State, 114 Tenn. 483, 88 S.W. 1040 (1904), in which the accused admittedly
shot his daughter's husband because he thought his daughter was being abused by
the victim. After the shooting, the daughter said to the accused, "if you had not
dared him out there two or three times, there wouldn't have been no harm done."
Id. at 496, 88 S.W. at 1043. Although the court reversed the conviction because of
an improper jury instruction, it might have asked whether it was likely that a father
would further provoke his daughter in such a grief-stricken situation.
340 Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 427 n.4, 32 A.2d 889, 893 n.4 (1943)
(Maxey, C.J., dissenting).
141Id.
at 425, 32 A.2d at 892 (Maxey, C.J., dissenting).
2
34 Id. at 426, 32 A.2d at 892 (Maxey, C.J., dissenting) ; accord, Jones v. State,
2 Ga. App. 430, 435, 58 S.E. 559, 560 (1907) (alternative holding), in which the court
excluded an accusation by a drunk against two sisters who had fled their house to
escape him. The court said, "it would be carrying the rule very far to hold that the
silence of a frightened woman to the maudlin statement of a drunken man was an

implied admission .

. . ."

Accusations by a slave to a free white have been admitted,

however. Martin v. State, 39 Ala. 523 (1865) ; Spencer v. State, 20 Ala. 24 (1852)
(dictum).
143 Geiger v. State, 70 Ohio St. 400, 414, 71 N.E. 721, 725, reversing 2 Ohio C.C.R.
(n.s.) 174 (Hamilton County Ct 1904) (alternative holding) ; cf. Davis v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 809, 265 S.W. 316 (1924) (four- or five-year-old girl) ; Robinson v.
State, 235 Miss. 100, 108 So. 2d 583 (1959) (two-and-one-half-year-old stepson),
note 84 supra.
144 See State v. Claymonst, 96 N.J.L. 1, 114 Atl. 155 (Sup. Ct. 1921), appeal
dismissed, 97 NJ.L. 345, 117 Atl. 145 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922) (four-year-old) ; State
v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 710, 94 S.E.2d 915, 923 (1956) (dictum) (three-year-old);
State v. Hawkins, 214 N.C. 326, 199 S.E. 284 (1938) (twelve-year-old) ; State v.
Wilson, 205 N.C. 376, 171 S.E. 338 (1933) (three-year-old); State v. Bowman, 80
N.C. 432 (1879) ; Commonwealth v. Lisowski, 274 Pa. 222, 117 Atl. 794 (1922) (less
than five years old).
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such as murder of the child's parent 145 or abuse of the child. 146 Such
statements would seem to compel a denial more strongly than would an
147
accusation of a crime not personal to the child.
A sense of deference by the accused may be more likely to prevent
a denial than a feeling of superiority. Thus, courts have appropriately
excluded a client's silence when his own attorney made an inculpatory
statement in his presence. 148
c. Crowds
If the accusation takes place in a crowd, the evidence should be excluded if the group is sufficiently hostile' 49 that the accused might have
feared violence or felt that a denial would be futile. A neutral crowd'150
is less likely to deter a response, and in that situation evidence of a tacit
admission seems permissible.

III. ACCUSATIONS DURING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
Although many jurisdictions have adopted a "per se" rule that the
arrest of the accused excludes evidence of a subsequent admission by
silence,' 51 most current litigation concerning the tacit admissions rule arises
in jurisdictions allowing evidence of accusations that occurred in the pres'45 Robinson v. State, 235 Miss. 100, 108 So. 2d 583 (1959) ; State v. Bowman,
.supranote 144; Commonwealth v. Lisowski, supranote 144.
146 State v. Claymonst, 96 N.J.L. 1, 114 Ati. 155 (Sup. Ct 1921), appeal dismissed,
97 N.J.L. 345, 117 Atl. 145 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922); State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701,
94 S.E.2d 915 (1956) (dictum).
147 But see State v. Wilson, 205 N.C. 376, 171 S.E. 338 (1933) (child accused
defendant of burning family cow).
148 State v. Dickey, 46 W. Va. 319, 33 S.E. 231 (1899) ; cf. Bob v. State, 32
Ala. 560 (1858) (alternative holding) (excluding slave's reaction when accused by
a group of white persons). Compare People v. Koerner, 154 N.Y. 355, 373-75, 48
N.E. 730, 736-37 (1897), in which a doctor accused the defendant of feigning unconsciousness. Whether because he was unconscious or was "faking it," the accused
was silent. The court shrewdly excluded the evidence, holding that if the accused
was unconscious he did not hear the statement, and if he was feigning unconsciousness he was not likely to give himself away by a denial.
149 Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 132 Ky. 269, 278, 116 S.W. 344, 347 (1909)
(alternative holding) (defendant was confronted by an "angry crowd . . . of 30
men') ; accord, Bob v. State, 32 Ala. 560 (1858) (alternative holding).
The cases have uniformly admitted the evidence when the crowd was friendly or
sympathetic to the accused. People v. Paisley, 299 Ill. 576, 132 N.E. 822 (1921)
(meeting of bank directors) ; State v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 432 (1879) (guests of the
accused); see State v. Mortensen, 26 Utah 312, 329-32, 73 Pac. 562, 567-68 (1903)
(neighbors of the accused).
150 See Character v. State, 212 Miss. 30, 53 So. 2d 41 (1951) (admissible);
Tate v. State, 95 Miss. 138, 48 So. 13 (1909) (alternative holding) (excluded on
other grounds); State v. Johnson, 73 N.J.L. 199, 63 Atl. 12 (Sup. Ct. 1906) (admissible).
151 The rule, sometimes called the Massachusetts rule, had its origin in Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847) (Shaw, C.J.), which reversed the
conviction of a man whose silence while under arrest was admitted into evidence.
Subsequent cases in Massachusetts and elsewhere have broadened that decision into
the present prophylactic rule. See 12 B.U.L. Rlv. 276 (1932).
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ence of police officials, who often are aware of the tacit admissions rule. 5 2
This awareness has caused an increasing tendency on the part of law enforcement officials to accuse suspected persons or to confront a mute conspirator with the inculpatory confession of an accomplice.153 The recent
Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence states:
[Miany cases involving admissions by silence rest on attenuated
reasoning. Some courts have been rather uncritical about this
kind of evidence, with the result that the rule has been subject to
considerable abuse in certain jurisdictions. For example, it has
become the practice of some police to make wholesale accusations
against one who may not even yet be formally an accused, or
against one who is in jail. If the unfortunate "declarant" abides
by the maxim that "silence is golden" and holds his tongue, he
may find police accusations brought into court against him as
substantive [sic] evidence, as an adoptive admission by silence.15
A. Analysis of Cases Not Applying the Per Se Rule
1. The Declaration
a. DeclarationsMade by Officials
It is not unusual for the police verbally to accuse arrested persons, 55
perhaps in hopes of prompting a confession or a tacit admission by failure
The following cross-examination of a police chief occurred:
Q.-Is it not a fact that you had Wilson repeat his confession in the presence
of McCullum so as to be able to offer it in court against McCullum when his
trial came on?
A.-Yes, sir.
State v. McCullum, 18 Wash. 394, 396, 51 Pac. 1044, 1045 (1897) (excluding the
evidence); see People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 717, 172 P.2d 18, 27-28 (1946),
20 So. CAx.. L. Rxv. 224 (1947); Conn v. State, 228 Miss. 833, 846, 89 So. 2d 840,
845 (1956) ; State v. Dills, 208 N.C. 313, 315, 180 S.E. 571, 572 (1935) ("There could
have been but one purpose in forcing the appellants to hear read the affidavits in the
presence of the affiants, and that was to procure evidence against them ....
") ;
State v. Hester, 137 S.C. 145, 188, 134 S.E. 885, 898 (1925); note 154 infra and
accompanying text. Compare Boyd v. State, 230 Ark. 991, 328 S.W.2d 122 (1959) ;
People v. Gaines, 192 Cal. App. 2d 128, 13 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961)
(police played recorded confession of accomplice to defendant) ; Miller v. State, 231
Md. 215, 189 A.2d 635 (1963) (accuser had motive to get revenge on the accused).
153 It is not unusual for a suspect to be faced with prepared inculpatory statements of some length. See, e.g., People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 717, 172 P.2d
18, 28 (1946) (nine pages) ; Rickman v. State, 230 Ind. 262, 103 N.E.2d 207 (1952)
(over
one thousand words).
154
152

NEW JERSEY SUPREmE COURT COmmiTTEE ON EVIDENcE, REPORT

164 (1963).

A Pennsylvania judge has noted "the growing abuse of the rule by enforcement
officers who, I think, are encouraged by the courts . . . ." Commonwealth v. Mark-ich, 178 Pa. Super. 169, 175, 113 A.2d 323, 326 (1955) (Woodside, J., dissenting).
Police interrogators are advised at times "to have the confessing offender confront
and accuse his accomplice. Then, if no denial is made by the accomplice, the accusation
and the fact of his silence may be used in many states as evidence pointing toward his
guilt." INBAU & REID, Lm D-rEcrION AND CRMINAL INTFRROGATION 230 (3d ed.
1953) ; see authorities cited note 152 supra.
155 E.g., Kennedy v. State, 39 Ala. App. 676, 107 So. 2d 913 (1958) ; State v.
Hayden, 243 La. 794, 147 So. 2d 392 (1962); Plymale v. Commonwealth, 195 Va.
582, 588-92, 79 S.E.2d 610, 614-16 (1954).
An analogous case concerned a statement in the defendant's presence by an officer
to his superior that the arrested defendant had just tried to bribe the officer in an
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to deny guilt. Another official, such as an examining doctor,156 may utter
the accusatory statement, or the police may repeat an inculpatory statement they have heard.157 More often, police interrogation will contain
incriminating, leading questions.1 58 The per se rule excludes such statements if the accused remains silent.
It has been argued that a tacit admission may occur at the time of
arrest, 159 when the accused may be told of the charge against him. 6 0
However, the risk that the accused will think it futile to try to prevent
the arrest by a denial 161 should be sufficient to exclude the response.
b. Declarations Made by an Accomplice
Tacit admission situations often occur when an alleged accomplice
makes a confession that incriminates the listener. The inculpatory stateeffort to obtain his release. Perhaps because the crime referred to had itself occurred
during custody, the court made an exception to the per se rule and admitted the
evidence. Rocchia v. United States, 78 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1935). The case has been
criticized for setting up an unclear circumstances test that invites reversals, and for
placing "an undue burden on the accused, who must make an instantaneous appraisal
of the circumstances and decide whether to risk incriminating himself in the course
of a denial or to risk producing evidence against himself by silence in case the court,
after a leisurely study of the circumstances in retrospect, decides that he should have
spoken up." Note, 40 MiNN. L. REv. 598, 603 (1956).
156 Compare Walker v. State, 197 Ga. 221, 28 S.E.2d 656 (1944) (examining
doctor told rape suspect he had recently had intercourse, which is not an accusation
of a crime; held admissible), with Walker v. State, 80 Okla. Crim. 21, 156 P.2d 143
(1945) (doctor told arrested accused he was drunk; excluded).
157 See, e.g., State v. Yochelman, 107 Conn. 148, 139 AUt. 632 (1927) (police
read statement of injured victim to the victim and the accused) ; Ellington v. State,
24 Okla. Crim. 67, 69, 215 Pac. 964 (1923) ("they . . . said you were bootlegging") ;
Dykeman v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 807, 113 S.E.2d 867 (1960) (police read the
accused a lengthy question-and-answer statement).
Of course, if the police declaration is in the form of repeating a third-party
accusation, rather than one made by the speaker, the evidence should be excluded
whether or not made in a police situation. See notes 57-62 supra and accompanying
text.
18 E.g., State v. Jackson, 369 S.W.2d 199, 262 (Mo. 1963). Compare text accompanying note 50 supra. Mere silence under interrogation should never be treated
as a tacit admission. See State v. Butler, 32 N.J. 166, 181-85, 160 A.2d 8, 15-17,
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 984 (1960) (holding of nonprejudicial error). But see State v.
Boswell, 119 Kan. 670, 671, 240 Pac. 848, 849 (1925) (refusal to "answer . . .
questions . . . [when] answers were naturally and reasonably to be expected

. .

.

is

ordinarily admissible').
159 See People v. Garreau, 27 Ill. 2d 388, 189 N.E.2d 287 (1963) ; State v. Guffey,
39 S.D. 84, 163 N.W. 679 (1917); cf. State v. Rush, 286 S.W.2d 767 (Mo. 1956)
(policeman asked defendant prior to arrest to explain his presence).
160 A person apprehended with stolen goods is usually under a duty to explain
his possession, 1 WIGMOlE, EVIDFNCE § 152, at 599 (3d ed. 1940), and this raises a
similar question because silence is a failure to explain. See People v. McFarland,
58 Cal. 2d 748, 376 P.2d 449, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1962) ; State v. Poynter, 24 Idaho
504, 205 Pac. 561 (1921) ; State v. Ryan, 47 S.D. 596, 200 N.W. 1018 (1924). But
see Helton v. United States, 221 F2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1955) (failure under police
interrogation to explain possession of narcotics is protected by "the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Fifth Amendment!').
161 See Thompson v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. 29, 224 S.W. 892 (1920) (excluded
evidence that accused, at time of arrest, failed to claim that the shooting was accidental, his ultimate defense). Intemperate accusations also may seem futile to
deny. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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ment may be made in the presence of the accused during the police interrogation of his associate; 162 his "accomplice" may accuse him voluntarily
sometime after apprehension; 163 or the statement may be read to the
accused by the police, with 164 or without 16 the presence of the accusing
"accomplice." The accused may 16 6 or may not 167 be asked whether he
wishes to speak. In one case the police played a recording of his alleged
accomplice's confession for the accused. 168 It is difficult to imagine a
situation less likely to call for a reply. If a court rejects the per se rule,
it has only begun its inquiry into the question of whether the facts present
an implied admission; too many courts, however, end their inquiry with
a decision rejecting the exclusionary rule. An accused is arguably less
likely to deny a secondhand accusation by the police than one made directly by his accomplice, 169 or to deny one repeated by the police in the
accuser's absence than one made in his presence. He may be more likely
to speak if asked to do so, or if the accusation was brief and pointed
rather than a lengthy statement, since he may be confused as to when, or
if, he should speak during the reading of the statement. An accused
may also be loath to interrupt the interrogation of his comrade to deny
it'170 and less likely to respond to a statement made during the interrogation than if his associate accused him spontaneously.
162 See Moore v. State, 261 Ala. 578, 75 So. 2d 135 (1954) (dictum)
(excluding
the evidence); Commonwealth v. Lennon, 124 Pa. Super. 47, 188 Ati. 84 (1936)
(dictum) (admitting the evidence) ; cf. State v. Lubetldn, 78 Ariz. 91, 276 P.2d 520

(1954) (conversation with police; evidence admitted).

163 See, e.g., Tucker v. United States, 279 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1960) (admissible);
Burns v. State, 226 Ala. 117, 145 So. 436 (1932) (dictum) (admissible) ; Emmett v.
State, 195 Ga. 517, 25 S.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 774 (1943) (admissible);

Pierson v. Commonwealth, 229 Ky. 584, 595-97, 17 S.W.2d 697, 701-02 (1929) (dictum)
(admissible); State v. Johnson, 35 La. Ann. 842 (1883) (admissible); State v.
Kobylarz, 44 N.J. Super. 250, 130 A.2d 80 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 24 N.J. 548, 133
A.2d 395 (1957) (nonprejudicial error to admit) ; Murphy v. State, 36 Ohio St. 628
(1881) (admissible); Commonwealth v. Manuszak, 155 Pa. Super. 309, 38 A.2d 355
(1944) (admissible).
(admissible);
164 See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 263 Pac. 226 (1928)

State v. Dills, 208 N.C. 313, 180 S.E. 571 (1935)

(inadmissible).

165 See Skiskowski v. United States, 158 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied,

330 U.S. 822 (1947) (excluded) ; State v. Hester, 137 S.C. 145, 173-89, 191-94, 134
S.E. 885, 894-902 (1926) (excluded).
166 See Commonwealth v. Lennon, 124 Pa. Super. 47, 188 Atl. 84 (1936) (dictum)
(admissible).

(dictum) (inad167 See Moore v. State, 261 Ala. 578, 75 So. 2d 135 (1954)
missible) ; Conn v. State, 228 Miss. 833, 89 So. 2d 840 (1956) (harmless error to
admit) ; Commonwealth v. Kiefaber, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 451, 462 (Bucks County Ct.
1961), aff'd per curiam, 197 Pa. Super. 298, 179 A.2d 262, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 870
(1962) (admissible); Knight v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 433, 83 S.E.2d 738 (1954)
(inadmissible).
168 People v. Gaines, 192 Cal. App. 2d 128, 130, 13 Cal. Rptr. 359, 360 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1961). The suspect announced his refusal to speak after saying, "he can cop
out if he wants." The court thought the recording inadmissible except that the de-

fendant had failed to object at trial. The conviction was reversed on other grounds,
however.

169 See People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 718, 172 P.2d 18, 28 (1946), 20 So.
L. Rxv. 224 (1947).
170 Since the accuser was under interrogation, the defendant "had no reason to
believe that he was expected to say anything. It was the woman and not himself
CAL.
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Suppose that two alleged accomplices begin to argue with each other
as to who was responsible for the crime. The courts have tended to exclude such conversations,171 perhaps because a counter-accusation is in
effect a denial. On the other hand, if an accusation contains an admission, such as "Sure, I drove the getaway car, but you shot that bank
teller," it clearly should be admissible against the speaker as an express
admission. 172
The use of an accused's silence to his alleged accomplice's incriminating
confession as a tacit admission has provided the police 173 with an easy
method of evading the rule that a confession is admissible only against the
1 74
speaker.
c. DeclarationsMade by Third Parties
Other persons, such as an informer, 75 a victim of the crime, 176 or an
interested third party 177 have occasionally accused the defendant in the
presence of the police. Varying degrees of police prompting may exist,
from an arrangement of the confrontation to a request that the speaker
repeat his accusation in front of the defendant. 178
who was being interrogated. He might reasonably have expected that his own interrogation would come later. The accusation implicit in the woman's statements was
not made to him but to the officers." Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 436,
32 A.2d 889, 897 (1943) (Maxey, C.J., dissenting). But see People v. Pollock, 226
App. Div. 406, 235 N.Y. Supp. 553 (1929) (preceding adoption of per se rule).
'71 See People v. Bob, 29 Cal. 2d 321, 175 P2d 12 (1946); Commonwealth v.
Osman, 284 Mass. 421, 188 N.E. 226 (1933) (alternative holding) (accusations admitted only against the speaker in a joint trial) ; People v. De Paulo, 235 N.Y. 39,
138 N.E. 498 (1923).
172 Cf. People v. Lehne, 359 Ill. 631, 195 N.E. 468 (1935).
The very fact that a
person makes an accusation may imply that he has knowledge of the crime. Commonwealth v. Osman, supra note 171.
173 See notes 152, 154 supra.
174 7 WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 2100(d) at 496 (3d ed. 1940).
Lengthy confessions
may be several pages long, cf. cases cited note 153 supra, and thus represent extensive
prejudicial hearsay.
175 Gentili v. United States, 22 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1927).
176 E.g., People v. Hughes, 203 Cal. App. 2d 598, 21 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962) (alternative holding) (admissible, or nonprejudicial if inadmissible) ; Skidmore
v. State, 59 Nev. 320, 92 P.2d 979 (1939) (admissible); State v. Sorge, 125 NJ.L.
445, 15 A.2d 776 (Ct. Err. & App.) (dictum), affirming 123 N.J.L. 532, 10 A.2d 175
(Sup. Ct. 1940) (admissible); Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889
(1943) (admissible).
177E.g., State v. Wargo, 83 N.H. 532, 145 At. 456 (1929) (alternative holding)
(inadmissible) ; State v. Sawyer, 230 N.C. 713, 55 S.E.2d 464 (1949) (admissible);
State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622 (1961) (dictum) (admissible).
178 See, e.g., People v. Cascone, 185 N.Y. 317, 323-30, 78 N.E. 287, 289-91 (1906),
in which an arrested murder suspect was taken by the police into the presence of the
dying victim, who could not speak. The police, apparently in English, asked the
victim to write the name of his assailant, and he wrote the suspect's name. The
suspect shrugged his shoulders when the police read him the name. Thereafter the
police got an interpreter to speak to the victim in Italian, who again inculpated the
suspect in writing. The court, which had not yet adopted the per se rule, reversed
the conviction because the suspect, who had spoken to the victim in Italian before
being silenced by the police, was not shown to have understood the question asked
the victim by the interpreter, and because the police had rebuked the suspect for
speaking.
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d. PriorIdentifications
Several courts have used the tacit admissions doctrine to admit
prior identifications of the defendant and his reaction thereto.179 The
impersonality and formality of a lineup seem to make a reply unlikely in
such a setting. This abuse of the tacit admissions doctrine, however, is not
normally necessary to admit prior identifications. An increasing number
of courts permit a witness to testify that he previously identified the
defendant, believing that the initial spontaneous identification in the
police station is more probative, if arranged fairly, than the conditioned
and expected identification at trial.'r' Such a rule seems proper only if
the defendant can cross-examine the identifying witness to test his memory,
perception, and veracity.' 8s Some states permit only the identifying witness to so testify, 8 2 while others also allow an eyewitness to the identification to testify to it.183
Although use of this different exception to the hearsay rule excludes
the reaction of the accused, it permits the identification to be admitted even
if the accused denied his guilt, or if he was not aware of the identificatione.g., if he was separated by a pane of one-way glass. 184 It also permits a
court which has adopted the per se rule to accept such evidence.' 8 5
e. The Focus of the Declaration
A few cases have involved statements that specifically inculpate more
than one listener, raising the question of whether there is a substantial
possibility that two or three innocent listeners will remain silent, each expecting another to answer. The courts have tended to admit the silence
of each listener against him at trial, without considering that the presence
88
of another accused may weaken the likelihood of a denial from each.'
However, a denial by one person will obviate a tacit admission by
87
anyone.'
.79 E.g., Muse v. State, 29 Ala. App. 271, 196 So. 148, cert. denied, 239 Ala. 557,
196 So. 151 (1940), 25 MARQ. L. REv. 218 (1941); People v. Smith, 25 Ill. 2d 219,
184 N.E.2d 841 (1962); State v. Claymonst, 96 N.J.L. 1, 114 Atl. 155 (Sup. Ct.
1921), appeal dismissed, 97 N.J.L. 345, 117 Ati. 145 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922).

180 MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WmNSTmN, CASES ON EVIDENCE 268 (1957).
181 See UNIFORm RULE OF EvIDENcE 63(1); Comment, Prior Identification
Evidence and the Hearsay Objection, 30 RocKY MT. L. REv. 332 (1958).
182 E.g., Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W2d 825 (Ky. 1957).
183 Comment, 30 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 332 & n.2 (1958).
184 See Bullock v. State, 219 Md. 67, 148 A.2d 433 (1959).
185 Some courts have relied on this exclusionary rule to bar prior identifications.
Thomas v. State, 237 Ind. 537, 147 N.E.2d 577 (1958) ; Commonwealth v. Walker, 95
Mass. (13 Allen) 570 (1866) ; State v. Dengel, 248 S.W. 603 (Mo. 1923).
186 See Williams v. State, 81 Ala. 1, 1 So. 179 (1886) ; Edwards v. State, 155
Fla. 550, 20 So. 2d 916 (1945); People v. Torres, 19 Ill. 2d 497, 167 N.E.2d 412
(1960) ; State v. Postal, 215 Minn. 427, 10 N.W.2d 373 (1943) ; cf. Smiley v. State,
156 Ga. 60, 118 S.E. 713 (1923) (one accused pointed to three others and told the
role of each in the crime).
187 People v. Shellenberger, 25 Cal. App. 2d 402, 77 P.2d 506 (Dist. Ct. App.
1938).
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Courts have tended to reject evidence of tacit admissions in which
a statement accuses one of several listeners, but fails to specify which one.
Thus the statement, "that damn negro killed that woman," was excluded
because several Negroes were present, and the speaker did not specify any
one of them.' 88 A significant factor which may prevent a response in this
situation is the fear that protesting too much would manifest a false
consciousness of guilt. Thus, in one case the prosecution sought to show
that the defendant was the only one of three alleged accomplices who
denied an accusation, arguing that he was the one who had displayed guilt
feelings. The court excluded the evidence, saying, "had he kept silent
could it not have been argued with equal if not greater force that his
failure to deny was the silent admission of guilt?" 189
Different considerations should exclude the accused's silence, however,
if the husband'90 or attorney'91 of the accused is present. An innocent
accused may well remain silent, relying on the "person in charge" to
handle the situation.
2. The Response
a. Ambiguous Responses

i. Inconsistent Responses
In many cases, particularly when the police have conducted several
interrogations or have confronted the accused with incriminating statements more than once, the accused will make inconsistent responses. The
inconsistencies may also exist in one conversation or interrogation. Some
answers may be tantamount to admissions, some may be denials, and some
may be silence.192 If the inconsistencies occur in one conversation or interrogation, it seems proper to admit the entire exchange if the accused has
made any statements sufficiently damaging to qualify as admissions, unless
the trial judge can excise those questions denied by the accused, and those
to which he made no response, without depriving the jury of a coherent
188 Hanna v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 5, 9, 79 S.W. 544, 545 (1904) (alternative
holding); see Eaton v. Commonwealth, 122 Ky. 7, 90 S.W. 972 (1906) (alternative
holding); Felder v. State, 23 Tex. Ct. App. R. 477, 5 S.W. 145 (1887) ; cf. People
v. Davis, 210 Cal. 540, 552-53, 293 Pac. 32, 37-38 (1930). See also Crowell v. State,

56 Tex. Crim. 480, 120 S.W. 897 (1909).

189 Poole v. United States, 97 F.2d 423, 425 (9th Cir. 1938).

190 See Anderson v. State, 197 Ark. 600, 124 S.W.2d 216 (1939) (excluded).
Compare Musfelt v. State, 64 Neb. 445, 90 N.W. 237 (1902) (girl and her boy friend
accused by her mother of fornication; held admissible).
'9' See People v. Hailey, 149 Cal. App. 2d 453, 308 P.2d 517 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957) (excluded).
192 See, e.g., Wilcutt v. State, 123 So. 2d 193 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied with
opinion, 271 Ala. 315, 123 So. 2d 203 (1960) ; People v. Gallagher, 168 Cal. App. 417,
336 P.2d 259 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); State v. Boswell, 119 Kan. 670, 240 Pac. 848
(1925).
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and intelligible picture.193

In such cases the court should require, if so

requested by the defense, that the prosecutor introduce only those questions to which the accused gave ambiguous or incriminating answers. If
the inconsistencies occur in separate conversations, the conversations
should be treated separately. Thus the conversation containing denials
should be excluded, whereas the one containing an admission should not.19 4
Most courts have excluded all the evidence, however, when the
accused made an initial denial and then remained silent later in the
conversation or in subsequent interviews. 19 5 These courts have properly
concluded that an accused is not likely to "continue to shout his denial," 19
or that "it may well be that having denied his guilt on the previous occasion . . . he thought it useless to continue to do SO." 197
193 Some states admit the entire conversation. Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157
Mass. 180, 200, 31 N.E. 961, 968 (1892) (dictum) ; People v. Greeson, 230 Mich. 124,
135-40, 203 N.W. 141, 145-47 (1925); State v. Dowling, 348 Mo. 589, 154 S.W2d
749 (1941) (dictum), 27 WAsH. U.L.Q. 132. So does California, People v. Whitehorn,
383 P.2d 783, 32 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Sup. Ct 1963), unless the police interrogation was
"insistent," or extensive hearsay would be admitted. In such cases the entire interchange should be excluded. People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 718-19, 172 P.2d
18, 29 (1946), 20 So. CAL. L. Rav. 224 (1947). Compare People v. Chavez, 50 Cal.
2d 778, 790-92, 329 P.2d 907, 915-16 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 993 (1959)
(admitting statements to which defendant said he did not remember held nonprejudicial
error). Minnesota suggests that the "trial court . . . admit the testimony and
later . . . strike the incompetent part from the record." State v. Rediker, 214 Minn.
470, 480, 8 N.W.2d 527, 532 (1943). It seems more satisfactory, however, to excise
the incompetent portions before the evidence reaches the jury, if possible, as in the
case of a recorded interrogation. See People v. Brumback, 152 Cal. App. 2d 386,
314 P.2d 98 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
Compare Skiskowski v. United States, 158 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 822 (1947), in which the accused nodded his head silently during the
reading of his alleged accomplice's confession which also inculpated him, but then
denied guilt after the reading. The court excluded the evidence, holding that the
denial vitiated the effect of the nodding.
194See Commonwealth v. Twombly, 319 Mass. 464, 66 N.E.2d 362 (1946);
State v. Dowling, supra note 193, cases which reversed convictions when both conversations were admitted.
195E.g., People v. Collins, 234 N.Y. 355, 364-65, 137 N.E. 753, 757 (1922)
(alternative holding) ; State v. Dills, 208 N.C. 313, 180 S.E. 571 (1935) (alternative
holding) ; Zeller v. State, 123 Ohio St 519, 176 N.E. 81 (1931). Contra, e.g., Albano
v. State, 89 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1956) (alternative holding) ; Owens v. Commonwealth,
186 Va. 689, 697-704, 43 S.E.2d 895, 898-902 (1947) (holding reiteration of the
denial necessary).
Pennsylvania law is quite confused on this issue. In Commonwealth v. Mazarella,
279 Pa. 465, 124 Atl. 163 (1924) (alternative holding), the supreme court stated
that a previous denial is sufficient to exclude a later admission by silence. Subsequent superior court cases, however, have either ignored or limited Mazarella. See
Commonwealth v. Ford, 86 Pa. Super. 483 (1926) (ignoring Mazarella); Commonwealth v. Weigand, 134 Pa. Super. 603, 5 A.2d 385 (1939) (same); Commonwealth
v. Zimmerman, 143 Pa. Super. 331, 17 A.2d 714 (1940) (noting that the facts of
Mazarella contained repeated previous denials and one subsequent to the silence);
Commonwealth v. Dodson, 174 Pa. Super. 421, 101 A.2d 411 (1953) (alternative
holding) (ignoring Mazarella).
19 People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 93, 143 N.E. 448, 455 (1924). A subsequent
party-admission, however, is not rendered inadmissible by a previous denial. See,
e.g., People v. Moore, 211 Cal. App. 2d 568, 27 Cal. Rptr. 526 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
(dictum) ; Gillespie v. State, 215 Miss. 380, 61 So. 2d 150 (1952); People v. La
Barbera, 159 Misc. 177, 287 N.Y. Supp. 257 (Sup. Ct 1936).
197 People v. Bennett, 413 Ill. 601, 609, 110 N.E.2d 175, 178 (1953).
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ii. Lies
It is normally held that lies by an accused in response to an accusation are admissible as manifesting a consciousness of guilt. 198 As the
Florida Supreme Court has indicated, however, in many cases the accused's answer may not be admitted into evidence as a lie, because proof
of its falseness would first require a conviction. 199 One solution may be
to admit only statements that can be shown to be false independently of
2° °
proving the accused guilty of the crime.
iii. Threats
If the accused responds to an accusation with a threat, such as "I
202
would like to kill you," 20 ' courts have uniformly admitted the evidence.
This result seems correct because such an affirmative response may provide a substantial basis to infer a guilty conscience, although there is a
20 3
risk that an innocent "tough guy" would frame a denial in this manner.
b. Responses Claiming the Right of Silence
The majority of jurisdictions exclude accusations when the accused's
response is an explicit refusal to speak. 20 4 Refusals to speak based on the
198

See People v. Miller, 19 Cal. App. 2d 708, 66 P.2d 448 (Dist. Ct App. 1937) ;

Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 870, 82 S.W. 592 (1904) (dictum); Com-

monwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 301-03, 188 Ati. 304, 309-10 (1936).
199 Douglas v. State, 89 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1956). One appellate court affirmed a
ruling that admitted into evidence a denied accusation by looking to the evidence
and the verdict and holding that the denial was a lie I See People v. Scott, 84 Cal.
App. 642, 258 Pac. 638 (Dist. Ct App. 1927).
200 See Douglas v. State, supra note 199.
201 Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 313, 151 N.E. 297, 299 (1926).
202 See Robinson v. State, 243 Ala. 684, 11 So. 2d 732, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 755
(1943); Skidmore v. State, 59 Nev. 320, 326, 92 P.2d 979, 982 (1939) ("You had
better be careful what you say"). Compare Commonwealth v. Simpson, 300 Mass. 45,
52, 13 N.E.2d 939, 943, cert. denied, 304 U.S. 565 (1938) ("Shut your . . . mouth").
203 Flight from the scene of the crime or from the police is also admissible as
conduct manifesting a consciousness of guilt, one theory upon which tacit admissions
are accepted. People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 93, 143 N.E. 448, 455 (1924) (dictum);
Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 870, 82 S.W. 592 (1904) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943) (dictum). However, there
is a risk, perhaps more significant than in tacit admission cases, that the flight may
reflect a general sense of guilt or guilt of another crime causing fear of the police,
rather than guilt of this specific crime. See Miller v. United States, 320 F.2d 767,
770-73 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (opinion of Bazelon, C.J.); Note, 35 CALIF. L. Ray. 128,
129, 130 nn.14 & 17 (1947). One way of overcoming this risk is to require a showing
that the suspect had reason to believe that he would be sought in connection with the
crime charged. Embree v. United States, 320 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1963).
Many courts exclude evidence of the defendant's refusal to take a polygraph test,
an intoximeter breath test, or a urinary or blood test. See State v. Munroe, 22 Conn.
Supp. 321, 171 A.2d 419 (Cir. Ct. 1961) (nonprejudicial error to admit evidence
of refusal to take blood test); State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 52 N.W.2d 458
(1952) (polygraph). But cf. State v. Tryon, 145 Conn. 304, 142 A.2d 54 (1958)
(admitting the refusal to take intoximeter breath test, which was accompanied by
a threat). Fundamental, perhaps, is the feeling emanating from the privilege against
self-incrimination that an accused should not be penalized for his refusal to help the
police gather evidence against him. Significantly, the compilers of the Uniforin
Rules of Evidence felt it necessary to note that tests measuring physical and mental
condition do not violate the privilege. UNIFORm RULE OF EvIDENc. 25(b)-(c) &
comment c.
204 E.g., People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 711-21, 172 P.2d 18, 24-30 (1946),
20 So. CAL. L. Ray. 224 (1947); White v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 416, 166 S.W.2d
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advice of counsel 205 or the accused's wish to consult counsel are almost
always excluded,20 6 as is explicit reliance on the privilege against selfincrimination.2 0 7 Similar responses, such as "I'll talk in court," 208 and
even, "Do you think I would tell you something that would put me in
°
jail?" 209
have been generally excluded, although they do not explicitly
claim a constitutional privilege. Nor does such a claim seem relevant;
the express refusal to speak, however expressed, negates any possible
210

tacit admission.

3. Circumstantial Factors Impeding a Reply
a. Psychological Considerations

i. Surprise
In Terrasas v. State,211 an Arizona policeman found the body of a
rustled calf near the defendant's house. His party entered the house and
promptly accused the defendant, who was in bed. In People v. Smith,21 2 a
873 (1942) (alternative holding); People v. DeBolt, 26 Mich. 39, 256 N.W. 615
(1934) ; Plymale v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 582, 588-92, 79 S.E.2d 610, 614-16 (1954).
Contra, e.g., Pritchett v. State, 40 Ala. App. 498, 117 So. 2d 345 (1959), petition for

cert. dismissed, 270 Ala. 211, 117 So. 2d 347 (1960) ; see People v. Whitehorn, 383
P.2d 783, 32 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Sup. Ct 1963) (not prejudicial error). Compare People
v. Andrae, 305 Ill. 530, 137 N.E. 496 (1922).
The law in the District of Columbia Circuit is conflicting. Compare United
States v. Kelly, 119 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C. 1954), with United States v. Peckham,
105 F. Supp. 775 (D.D.C. 1952), revd on other grounds, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
205 Automobile insurance identification cards may instruct an insured to make
no statement at the scene of an accident, and silence might reflect reliance on such
advice. If the insurance card instructed the holder to state his refusal to speak,
however, the accused's total silence could not have reflected this advice and it should
not be excluded on this ground.
20 E.g., People v. Fitzgerald, 204 Mich. 365, 169 N.W. 907 (1918); State v.
Dowling, 348 Mo. 589, 154 S.W.2d 749 (1941), 27 WAsH. U.L.Q. 132; State v. Hatley,
383 P.2d 247 (N.M. 1963) ; Gossett v. State, 373 P.2d 285 (Okla. Crim. 1962) (alternative holding). See generally Annot., Admissibility of Inculpatory Statements Made in
Presence of Accused to Which He Refuses To Reply on Advice of Counsel, 77
A.L.R.2d 463 (1961).
(alternative
207 See State v. Bowdry, 346 Mo. 1090, 145 S.W.2d 127 (1940)
holding). Compare Commonwealth v. Towber, 190 Pa. Super. 93, 152 A.2d 917
(1959), holding that there can be no tacit admission when there is a claim of privilege,
but that the evidence reaches the jury so that they can decide whether the privilege
was invoked.
208 E.g., State v. Bryson, 47 Del. (8 Terry) 106, 87 A.2d 640 (Super. Ct 1952);
People v. Hanley, 317 Ill. 39, 147 N.E. 400 (1925) (nonprejudicial error). Contra,
Phillips v. State, 206 Ga. 418, 57 S.E.2d 555 (1950).
209 Kelly v. United States, 236 F.2d 746, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1956); see People v.
Abel, 298 N.Y. 333, 83 N.E.2d 542 (1949).
210 Massachusetts distinguishes between a mere refusal to speak and silence on
advice of counsel and admits the evidence in the former case. Compare Commonwealth v. Sazama, 339 Mass. 154, 158 N.E.2d 313 (1959), with Commonwealth v.
Machado, 339 Mass. 713, 162 N.E.2d 71 (1959), and Commonwealth v. Hebert, 264
Mass. 571, 163 N.E. 189 (1928). This position seems untenable, and probably reflects
the strict Massachusetts view of a denial. See notes 99-101 supra and accompanying
text
21125 Ariz. 476, 219 Pac. 226 (1923).
212 111 Cal. App. 579, 295 Pac. 862 (Dist Ct App. 1931).
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prosecution for assaulting a movie usherette with intent to rape, the victim
notified the police upon seeing the defendant enter the theater about a week
after the offense. During the show she and a policeman approached within
five feet of the defendant, and the policeman instructed her, in words the
defendant could hear, to put her hand on her assailant. She touched the
defendant. In both cases the courts admitted the accused's silence as a tacit
admission, yet in both cases the surprising nature of the accusation may
well have prevented a reply. In Smith, the silent atmosphere of the theater
was hardly conducive to a vigorous denial, and the policeman's instructions
coupled with the touching by the girl may have been insufficient notice to
the defendant that he was being accused at all. In Terrasas,the court might
have inquired whether the accused was asleep; a person just awakened may
lack the presence of mind to deny an accusation. Courts should exclude
the evidence if it appears that the accused was caught unaware by an
accusation.
ii. Apparent Isolation
In Hildebrandtv. State,213 the prosecution sought to introduce the fact
that a witness had heard the defendant's wife accuse the defendant of a
liquor offense over the telephone, although he could only hear the wife's
part of the conversation. The court quite properly excluded the evidence
because there was no showing of the accused's response. The court also
stated, however, that an accused is not called upon to dissent to a witness
whose presence is unknown to him. This reasoning seems correct; it is
the known presence of witnesses as well as the accusation that makes a
denial more likely from an innocent person. Moreover, the fact that the
accused cannot observe the facial expressions of his accuser on the telephone may make his reaction less reliable. The accused's silence should
therefore be excluded even if the accused knew that he was speaking with
two persons at once over the telephone; 214 and it should likewise be excluded although the accusation was made to the accused's face if he was
unaware that a third party was listening.
b. JudicialProceedings
With virtual unanimity, the courts
missions arising out of prior judicial215
213 22 Okla. Crim. 58, 209 Pac. 785 (1922)
214 Compare People v. Bernstein, 171 Cal.

have refused to accept tacit ador quasi-judicial 21 6 proceedings,
(alternative holding).
App. 2d 279, 340 P.2d 299 (Dist. Ct.

App. 1959), note 107 supra, involving an evasive telephone response.
215 E.g., Bell v. State, 93 Ga. 557, 19 S.E. 244 (1893) (alternative holding);
State v. Senn, 32 S.C. 392, 11 S.E. 292 (1898) (alternative holding). Several cases
have concerned preliminary hearings. E.g., Jones v. State, 30 Ala. App. 360, 6 So. 2d
26 (1942) ; State v. Smith, 30 La. Ann. 457 (1878).
The Pennsylvania law is unclear. Compare Commonwealth v. Barnak, 357 Pa.
391, 416-18, 54 A.2d 865, 877-78 (1947), with Commonwealth v. Zorambo, 205 Pa. 109,
54 Atl. 716 (1903), and Commonwealth v. Russo, 177 Pa. Super. 470, 483, 111 A.2d
359, 365 (1955), modified on other grounds, 388 Pa. 462, 131 A.2d 83 (1957).
216 E.g., People v. Daily, 178 Mich. 354, 363-66, 144 N.W. 890, 894-95 (1914)
(alternative holding) (extradition proceeding) ; People v. Willett, 92 N.Y. 29 (1883)
(coroner's inquest); State v. Jackson, 150 N.C. 831, 64 S.E. 376 (1909) (election
investigation).
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because the orderly judicial process does not permit spontaneous interruptions from parties or observers. One court noted that it would violate
the privilege against self-incrimination if a defendant's protected silence
17
at one proceeding is used against him at another.
It is the decorum of such proceedings as well as their official character
which impedes a reply. The decorum at a nonofficial proceeding thus might
218
prevent a reply as effectively as that of regular judicial proceedings.
c. Police Activity

States rejecting the per se exclusionary rule should be sensitive to the
possibility that particular police activity has lessened the likelihood that an
innocent man would reply. Physical or mental duress,2 1 9 or threatsexpress

2

0

or implied-,

22 1

are substantial factors that may deter a response.

In one striking case, it was not surprising that the defendant remained
silent when he and seven other Negroes were manacled and being taken to
jail surrounded by a hostile crowd of accusing white people. The court held
the evidence inadmissible. 22 2 Nor should the evidence be received if the
police remove the accused before he is able to reply, 23 or if they have told
him to remain silent.224
If the defendant has been told by the police that he has the right not
to speak, almost all courts have excluded the evidence; 225 such advice may
lead an accused to think that his silence will best protect him and thus make
Parrott v. State, 125 Tenn. 1, 139 S.W. 1056 (1911).
Austin, 108 N.C. 780, 13 S.E. 219 (1891) (women's alliance
expulsion trial).
219 See People v. Clemmons, 153 Cal. App. 2d 64, 72-76, 314 P.2d 142, 147-50
(Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (alternative holding) (some third degree, nine days of
interrogation, repeated denials by the accused).
220 See Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 132 Ky. 269, 278-79, 116 S.W. 344, 347 (1909)
(alternative holding).
221But see Goldsby v. State, 240 Miss. 647, 675-77, 123 So. 2d 429, 440-41
(1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 861 (1961) (Negro accused when apprehended by
police with drawn guns).
222
Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 870, 82 S.W. 592 (1904).
2
See People v. Ross, 325 Ill. 417, 156 N.E. 303 (1927) (alternative holding).
(alternative holding); People v.
224 State v. Diskin, 34 La. Ann. 919 (1882)
Kennedy, 164 N.Y. 449, 58 N.E. 652 (1900); Fainbrough v. State, 3 Ohio L. Abs.
89 (Ct. App. 1924) ; People v. Kessler, 13 Utah 69, 82-83, 44 Pac. 97, 100-01 (1896).
Nor does the situation seem significantly different if two suspects are not permitted
to speak to each other, but are expected to deny a third-party accusation-an implication that may have escaped them. But see People v. Sullivan, 3 Cal. App. 502,
86 Pac. 834 (Dist. Ct. App. 1906). Only by expressly informing the suspect that he
may speak after his accuser finishes, see Johnson v. State, 151 Ga. 21, 105 S.E. 603
(1921), or by asking him whether the accusation is true would such a deterrent
to speech seem removed.
225 People v. Spencer, 78 Cal. App. 2d 652, 178 P.2d 520 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947);
Barber v. State, 191 Md. 555, 62 A.2d 616 (1948) (alternative holding) ; People v.
Young, 72 App. Div. 9, 76 N.Y. Supp. 275 (1902); Gardner v. State, 34 S.W. 945
(Tex. Crim. App. 1896) (alternative holding); Plymale v. Commonwealth, 195
Va. 582, 588-92, 79 S.E.2d 610, 614-16 (1954). Pennsylvania admits the evidence
with a jury instruction that if the accused was informed of his right to remain
silent there can be no tacit admission. Commonwealth v. Ford, 199 Pa. Super. 102,
184 A.2d 401 (1962).
217

-21 Compare State v.
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a reply unlikely. Moreover, it may dissuade him from explicitly claiming
his right not to speak, a tactic which normally excludes evidence of a tacit
m2 26
admission.
B. Problems Peculiar to Criminal Investigations
1. Evidentiary Considerations
The relevance and prejudice considerations applicable to tacit admissions in general also apply to tacit admissions in the presence of the police.
However, four additional evidentiary considerations further weaken the
probative value of the silence of an accused in this situation.
One consideration is the popular notion, buttressed by television and

228
radio programs,2 2 7 that arrested persons have the right to remain silent

and that "anything you say may be used against you." It is difficult to
estimate the percentage of accused persons that is aware of and relies on
this principle, which is based less upon the privilege against self-incrimination than on the lack of a police power to compel statements.
A second consideration weakening this aspect of the tacit admissions
doctrine is the possibility that persons will refrain from denying false
accusations because they fear the authorities. "[E]ven persons who are
entirely innocent of wrongdoing, are afraid to talk in the presence of detectives."2

29

A person may not be likely to provoke an accusing policeman by

contradicting him, or may remain silent because of a fear that his accusers
may not accurately report his statements.23 0
Similar to the notion of the right of silence is the belief in the wisdom
of silence. As one court observed,
from time immemorial it has generally been conceded an unwise
thing for those charged with criminal offenses to talk to anybody
and everybody about their cases, and especially . . . with those
who may not be friendly to them. . . . [M]any good lawyers

have advised clients to refrain from talking at all. This has been
the practice so long that it has become a well-known fact to our
231
people generally.
226
227
22

See notes 204-10 supra and accompanying text.

Comment, 13 ARK. L. REv. 123, 125 (1959).
See text accompanying note 233 infra; cf. State v. Hayden, 243 La. 793, 147

So. 2d 392 (1962).
229 State v. Hester, 137 S.C. 145, 185, 134 S.E. 885, 898-99 (1926) ; see Hanger v.
United States, 173 Fed. 54, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1909) (alternative holding); Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943); cf. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 483 n.10 (1963).
230 "His denials . . . might have brought his rebuke or something worse from
the officers present, and he might well have reasoned that if he had replied in that
hostile environment . . . , his replies might not have been either accurately or

fairly recorded."

Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 425, 32 A.2d 889, 892

(1943) (Maxey, CJ., dissenting); accord, Eaton v. Commonwealth, 122 Ky. 7, 11,
90 S.W. 972, 973 (1906), quoting 1 GRxNLPAF, EviDENCE § 197, at 272 (15th ed.
1892) ; O'Hearn v. State, 79 Neb. 513, 521-22, 113 N.W. 130, 133-34 (1907).
231 State v. Hester, 137 S.C. 145, 185, 134 S.E. 885, 899 (1926).
(Emphasis
added.) See People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 714-15, 172 P.2d 18, 26 (1946),
20 So. CAL. L. Ray. 224 (1947) ; State v. Scott, 120 Me. 310, 114 Atl. 159 (1921);
State v. Won, 76 Mont. 509, 523, 248 Pac. 201, 206 (1926).
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Finally, it has been suggested that the tacit admissions rule imperils
only those unaware of its existence.2 3 2 A knowledgeable defendant seems
more likely to be aware of this exception 'to the notion that "silence is
golden," and may elude the pitfalls of a tacit admission by issuing denials
when accused. The rule thus penalizes the wrong person-the inexperienced accused who may stand mute from fear or reliance on his right
to be silent.
2. Constitutional Considerations
a. The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
Traditionally the privilege against self-incrimination has not been
applied to situations arising in the police station because the police have no
legal power to compel testimony. 23 3 The recent history of -theprivilege as
interpreted by state and federal courts, however, has been one of expansion 2 3 4 to cover witnesses, 3 5 civil cases,23 6 grand juries,2 3 7 legislative

investigations,2 3 8 and administrative proceedings,239 all of which involve
legal compulsion. The Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules
of Evidence both would extend the privilege to a person appearing before
any "public official .
or any governmental agency or division
thereof ..

..

" 240

The states are not in accord as to whether the privilege applies to
police situations.2 41 In the federal courts, in spite of some confusion,
the privilege seems to be applicable to the police.Y
Brain v. United
232

Maguire, Adoptive Admissions in Massachusetts, Mass. L.Q., May 1929,
pp. 62, 78; Comment, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 593, 601-02 (1959); see note 256 infra.
23 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENC
§ 2252, at 328-29 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Exclusion
of the evidence because the accused refused to answer in reliance on the privilege,
cf. Commonwealth v. Towber, 190 Pa. Super. 93, 152 A.2d 917 (1959), must be distinguished from holding silence inadmissible because it is protected by the privilege.
The former is essentially an evidentiary decision based on the probative value of the
response, although necessarily influenced by the privilege; the latter is a constitutional
decision letermining the scope of the privilege.
234 Critics of this extension beyond its original goal "overlook the fact that a
noble principle often transcends its origins, that creative misunderstandings account
for some of our most cherished values and institutions; such a misunderstanding
may be the mother of invention." United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581
(2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
2358 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252, at 326 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
23
6McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); 8 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2252,
at 327
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
237
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252,
at 328 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
238 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) ; 8 WiGmoRE, EVIDsfrcE § 2252,
at 328 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
239

240

Ibid.
U CFORm RULE OF EVIDENcE

25;

MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule

203 (1942);

see id. illustration 2.
2418 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2252, at 329-30 n.27 (McNaughton rev. 1961). State
decisions applying the privilege include State v. Kirtley, 327 S.W.2d 166 (Mo.
1959) (dictum); State v. Dowling, 348 Mo. 589, 154 S.W.2d 749 (1941), 27 WASH.
U.L.Q. 132; see Crabb v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 323, 192 P.2d 1018 (1948) (affirmed
per se rule because of the right of silence).
242 See Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Bullock v. United
States, 122 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (dictum); Purpura v. United States, 262
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States24 held that the fifth amendment self-incrimination provision excluded coerced confessions and therefore necessarily applied the privilege to
24 5
the
police coercion. 244 Although Brain has had a checkered history,
of
coerced
area
the
it
in
resurrected
Supreme Court has quite recently
confessions, 246 raising the question whether the Brain view of the privilege
2 47
may not be in favor.
The purposes of the privilege should determine its application to
police investigations. One major purpose is based on a "sentiment of
fundamental fairness . . . which recoils from forcing another human

being to supply by his own act the incriminating evidence. It guards
against the abuses of physical compulsion which are apt to grow out of the
license to interrogate .... ,248 A second, springing from the first,
seeks to prevent the administration of the criminal law from developing
harmful practices.
[A] ny system of administrationwhich permits the prosecution to
trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof
must itself suffer morally thereby. The inclination develops to
satisfied with an
rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be
249
sources.
other
'the
of
investigation
incomplete
These reasons argue forcefully for application of the privilege to police
interrogations; 250 although the police lack legal power to compel testiFed. 473 (4th Cir. 1919) ; Sorenson v. United States, 143 Fed. 820 (8th Cir. 1906)

(citing Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897)); United States v. Conway,
217 F. Supp. 853 (D. Mass. 1962) (confession held involuntary when defendant was
not aware of her right not to incriminate herself); cf. Helton v. United States,
221 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1955) (the "spirit, if not the letter, of the Fifth Amendment" applied to exclude a failure to explain the possession of narcotics). See also
Kelley v. United States, 236 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (dictum reserving the
question; implies Brain might well exclude admissions by silence).
243 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
244 More recently, of course, the Supreme Court has used due process to reverse
state convictions based on coerced confessions. E.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568 (1961) ; Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
245 Brain was repudiated in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 191 n.35 (1953)
(dictum) (state conviction), but apparently approved in Opper v. United States,
348 U.S. 84, 92 n.8 (1954) (dictum) (federal conviction).
(Harlan,
246 See Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 347 (1963)
J.) ("The controlling test [of admissibility of a confession] is that approved in
Brain
2 47. .

.

.");

Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962)

(Douglas, J.).

Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Black, would apply the privilege to "investigative" proceedings. Mills v. Louisiana,
360 U.S. 230, 238 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
2488 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 296 n.1 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
249 Ibid. Concern has been voiced that the police could "build a complete case
on hearsay by merely examining witnesses in the presence of defendant." State v.
Gulbrandsen, 238 Minn. 508, 514, 57 N.W.2d 419, 423 (1953); see State v. Hester,
137 S.C. 145, 188, 134 S.E. 885, 899-900 (1925). Such evidence, however, cannot
alone support a conviction. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
250 See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1,
29 (1949). See also Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1955) (privilege arose from pretrial abuses).
Other considerations are that the language of the privilege is not limited to
legally compelled testimony, and that police investigations "perform the function of
the old English committing magistrate, before whom the privilege did apply."
8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2252, at 329 n.27 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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mony, their potential physical power is perhaps more coercive 2 51 and
2
justifies this extension of the privilege.

52

i. Relevance of the Privilege
The fifth amendment provides that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself"; and all states
recognize the privilege in some form. 23 The policies of forcing the police
to investigate and preventing them from obtaining evidence from the mouth
of the accused except voluntarily suggest that the privilege should protect
the silence of an accused in the presence of the police-unless he affirmatively signifies his willingness that his silence be used against him. This
view is supported by the risks that physical or psychological duress may so
exhaust an accused that he lacks the will to deny accusations.
One court held the privilege inapplicable, however, because there is no
compulsion to testify before the police. The court stated that admissions
by silence are no different from fingerprinting, photographing, or observing
the demeanor of the accused.2
Unlike those situations, however, the tacit
admissions doctrine allows the suspect a choice of whether or not to speak,
provided he knows the significance of a denial or an express refusal to
speak,2 55 and this choice should be voluntary. Many accused persons who
do not wish to confess presumably do not wish to adopt incriminating
accusations.
ii. Waiver of the Privilege
The privilege against self-incrimination is normally not available unless
it is claimed. Whether or not an accused's silence should be regarded as
251 See 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 318 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ; Comment,

6 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 593, 602 (1959).
2 52

Wigmore states that, "in view of the development of the complementary
constitutional doctrine excluding coerced confessions . . . it is doubtful that there
is sufficient reason today to distort the privilege to cover this situation." 8 WIGMoPE,
EVIDENCE § 2252, at 329 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Wigmore, however, has been
"consistently unfriendly to the privilege, especially to its recognition when there was
no direct coercion by the Government . . . ." De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d
140, 145 (5th Cir. 1962) (dictum), 49 VA.L. REV. 356 (1963).
253 Comment, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 593, 596 n.23 (1959).
254 Owens v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 689, 702, 43 S.E.2d 895, 900-01 (1947).
2-55 A guilty accused who is aware of the alternatives is forced to elect among
incriminating silence, an untruthful denial-a lie which may itself either be admissible
against him or involve him in ultimate self-contradiction through more falsehoods
as the police interrogation proceeds-, or an announcement, effective in most jurisdictions, that he refuses to speak. See State v. Dills, 208 N.C. 313, 180 S.E. 571
(1935). An accused who is unaware of the last alternative is forced to lie to avoid
incriminating himself through an admission by silence. An innocent accused may
avoid the dilemma by a truthful denial, or an express refusal to speak.
Occasional judicial opinions have recognized this potential indirect compulsion
and have condemned it. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 562-64 (1897)
(police accusation makes a response of the accused coerced); Territory v. Corum,
34 Hawaii 167, 178 (1937) (alternative holding) ("to draw a derogatory inference
from mere silence is to compel the respondent to testify") ; Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 870, 82 S.W. 592 (1904); People v. Cascia, 191 App. Div. 376,
181 N.Y. Supp. 855 (1920) (dissenting opinion), 34 HARv. L. REv. 205; Towery
v. State, 13 Okla. Crim. 216, 163 Pac. 331 (1917); cf. Note, 40 MrNN. L. REv.
598, 607 (1956).
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a waiver of the privilege ultimately will determine the applicability of the
privilege to silent admissions. The answer may depend upon the extent
to which laymen believe they have a constitutionally protected right of
silence in the police station,256 but it is impossible to estimate the number of
persons whose silence actually reflects a belief that the privilege protects
that silence. Some authorities have urged that silence in the presence of
the police be regarded as an implied claim of the privilege. 257 Although this
fiction has not been widely adopted, it would provide the privilege with the
generous scope it deserves. This broad view of the privilege may be the
basis of the per se rule, although most opinions emphasize evidentiary rather
than constitutional considerations.
iii. The Potential Effect of the Privilege
Although the waiver doctrine and doubt that the privilege against selfincrimination applies in the police station seem currently to prevent a finding that silence in the presence of the police is directly protected by the
privilege, the protection might be afforded by state and federal adoption
of an exclusionary rule not required by the privilege but designed to render
it fully effective. This approach is similar to the rule excluding from evidence in federal courts the results of illegal searches and seizures. 58 The
increasingly popular, although limited, per se rule indicates that state courts
might assume the initiative in applying an adequate exclusionary rule designed to protect the privilege.
If the states fail to exclude this evidence by a procedural or state constitutional requirement, the question of federal protection may arise. A
hurdle to federal constitutional protection of silence in the presence of state
authorities is Adamson v. California,5 9 which stated that the due process
clause does not incorporate the federal privilege of freedom from selfincrimination. It seems likely, however, that in the near future the Supreme
2 56
"[T]he innocent and inexperienced accused person . . . , being unacquainted
with the niceties of the rules of evidence, entertains the popular belief that he has

the right to remain silent [when under arrest]." Note, 40

MiNN.

L.

REv.

598, 602

(1956) ; see text accompanying note 232 supra.
257 See People v. Clemmons, 153 Cal. App. 2d 64, 76, 314 P.2d 142, 150 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1957) (alternative holding); People v. Cascia, 191 App. Div. 376, 383,
181 N.Y. Supp. 855, 860 (1920) (dissenting opinion), 34 HARv. L. REv. 205;
Towery v. State, 13 Okla. Crim. 216, 163 Pac. 331 (1917) ; Brody, Admissions Ilnplied From Silence, Evasion and Equivocation in Massachusetts Criminal Cases, 42
B.U.L. REV. 46, 52-53 (1962); cf. United States v. Conway, 217 F. Supp. 853
(D. Mass. 1962) (confession held involuntary when defendant was not told by police
of privilege, although she did not claim it); People v. Spencer, 78 Cal. App. 2d
652, 178 P.2d 520 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419,

438-39, 32 A.2d 889, 898 (1943) (Maxey, C.J. dissenting) (right to counsel).
258 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Subsequently the Court

stated that the rule "was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth
Amendment . . . ." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). In Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), however, the Court apparently read this requirement into
that amendment and into the fourteenth amendment due process clause.

59 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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Court will incorporate the federal self-incrimination privilege within the
m 260
due process clause.
If the Court does so, and if it applies the same
standards in state and in federal cases-as it has in the search and seizure
area 261__, the full scope of the federal privilege may bind all state criminal
trials. If the Supreme Court holds that evidence of silence in the presence
of the police violates the federal privilege against self-incrimination, this
determination would bind the states. However, if the Court excludes evidence in federal courts by means of a procedural rule designed to protect
the privilege but not required by it, it may have to consider whether this
requirement is so inherent in the privilege that it applies also to the states. 262
b. Due Process
The fourteenth amendment due process clause excludes confessions
physically or psychologically coerced,
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because
the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in
the enforcement of our criminal law . . . [that] the State must
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and
may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his
own mouth.263
This requirement of fundamental fairness,6 that confessions be voluntary,
seems applicable to admissions by silence, particularly since confessions are
more probative than inferred admissions.2 6 5 One court has stated that such
"acquiescence, to have the effect of an admission, must exhibit some act
of the mind and amount to voluntary demeanor or conduct ..

.,266

A proper scope for this constitutional guarantee of fairness should con260 Four members of the current Court, Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Black, Douglas, and Brennan would incorporate the privilege. Cohen v. Hurley,
366 U.S. 117, 153, 154 (1961) (dissenting opinions). Currently the Court has
granted certiorari in Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744, cert. granted,
373 U.S. 948 (1963), which presents anew the question of incorporation. 31 U.S.L.
WEx 3395 (June 4, 1963).
The Fifth Circuit has intimated that Adamson may be short-lived. See De Luna v.
United States, 308 F.2d 140, 154 nA0 (5th Cir. 1962), 49 VA. L. REv. 356 (1963).
The Supreme Court has stated through Mr. justice Douglas that the "element of
compulsion . . . condemned by the Fifth Amendment . . . [is an] ingredient of

due process." Gallegos v. United States, 370 U.S. 49, 51 (1962).
2 61
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1963) (dictum).
262 Cf. note 258 supraand accompanying text.
263 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) ; see Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (dictum). In federal courts coerced confessions appear
to be excluded on the authority of Brain, see, e.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States,
266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924), rather than fifth amendment due process.
264 See Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 509 (1958) ; Lisenba v. California, sipra
note 263, at 236.
265 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.

266 State v. Jackson, 150 N.C. 831, 833, 64 S.E. 376, 377

added.)

(1909).

(Emphasis
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clusively presume that the silence of an accused in the presence of the police
manifests an intention to protect himself,2 67 and should exclude it as an
involuntary admission. 26s Courts have been willing only to exclude tacit
admissions as involuntary, however, if the accused's announced refusal to
speak was followed by continued police interrogation and an alleged implied
admission?6 9 If the police strive to create this type of evidence, and if
the states fail to curb this practice by adopting an exclusionary rule, it is
foreseeable that due process may ultimately intervene, either on its own or
using an incorporated privilege against self-incrimination. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter wrote, the risk
is great that the police will accomplish behind their closed door
precisely what the demands of our legal order forbid: make a
suspect the unwilling collaborator in establishing his guilt. This
they may accomplish not only with ropes and a rubber hose, not
only by relay questioning persistently, insistently subjugating a
tired mind, but by subtler devices. 270
c. Right to Counsel

The expanding concept of the right to counsel 27 1 may ultimately affect
tacit admissions in the police context. The New York Court of Appeals
stated in affirming the per se rule, "he is then under no duty to speak and
his silence should not be counted as giving assent to what he hears. If he
had counsel, he would doubtless be advised not to talk. If he had not, he
267 "The circumstances must indicate that the 'declarant' by his conduct has
actually manifested his adoption or belief in the truth of the statement, that is, that
under the circumstances he would not be silent unless he really intended to manifest
his adoption of the statement." NEW JERSEY SUPREME CouRT COMMITTEE oN EviDENCE, REPORT
26
8 But see

164 (1963).

Emmett v.State, 195 Ga. 517, 535-37, 25 S.E.2d 9, 20-21, cert. denied,

320 U.S. 774 (1943); cf. Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 737 (9th Cir. 1960)
(dictum).
269 In this situation, the accused's "response is not a free and spontaneous one.
It is made under mental, if not physical coercion .

.

.

."

People v. Simmons, 28

Cal. 2d 699, 716, 172 P.2d 18, 27 (1946), 20 So. CAL. L. REv. 224 (1947); see
People v. Hodson, 406 Ill. 328, 94 N.E.2d 166 (1950) (alternative holding); cf.
People v. Williams, 133 Cal. 165, 65 Pac. 323 (1901) (alternative holding). See
also Kelley v. United States, 236 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (reserving question
whether coerced-confession rule bars similar evidence).
The question has arisen whether the coerced confession of an accomplice, if
silently heard by the defendant, can cause a tacit admission, and thus be admissible
against the defendant but not the coerced accomplice. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania said yes. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Pa. 303, 74 A.2d 144, rev'd
per curzam, 340 U.S. 881 (1950), in which reversal was based on the defendant's
own confession, which was apparently held to be coerced. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 627-28 & n.91 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (explaining
Johnson). See generally as to coerced witnesses, Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 549

(1962).

270 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 575 (1961)
(Emphasis added.)
271 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

(opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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should not be prejudiced thereby." 272 Although a state defendant has as
yet no federal right to have counsel at all times after arrest,273 if this constitutional guarantee continues to expand, there may be less patience with a
rule that penalizes an accused for doing what his lawyer would probably
advise him to do.
C. Remedies
1. The Per Se Rule
The probative weakness of silence, the possibility that silence in the
presence of authorities results from fear or a belief in a right of silence,
and constitutional considerations have led several courts 2 74 to adopt a
per se rule that the arrest of an accused excludes evidence of a subsequent
admission by silence. Recent commentators have generally favored this
77
2
rule2 75 Among the states,

76

2
twenty jurisdictions reject the per se rule,

272 People v. Rutigliano, 261 N.Y. 103, 107, 184 N.E. 689, 690 (1933) ; see State
v. Dowling, 348 Mo. 589, 154 S.W.2d 749 (1941) (alternative holding), 27 WASH.
U.L.Q. 132.
The Supreme Court has held, however, that a confession may be admissible in
a state trial although it occurred after the police refused the accused's request to
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (5-to-4 decision).
see counsel.
2 73
Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan believe
that he should. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 448 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
See Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962) (dictum), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 978 (1963) (police refusal to grant accused's request to see counsel makes
subsequent confession inadmissible if accused was unaware of his right to remain
silent and counsel would have advised him not to talk).
274 See State v. Redwine, 23 Wash. 2d 467, 471, 161 P.2d 205, 206-07 (1945),
20 WASH. L. REV. 234, in which the court stated that there is no "natural impulse

to speak . . . [and the accused] has a right to remain silent .

.

.

."

Compare

Cooper v. State, 189 A.2d 620, 623 (Md. 1963), holding that "he had the right to
remain silent because the circumstances . . . did not call for a denial." (Emphasis
added.) Hauger v. United States, 173 Fed. 54, 60 (4th Cir. 1909) (dictum), stated
that an arrested person may not feel "at liberty to speak." Constitutional provisions
were mentioned in Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1955) (privilege
against self-incrimination), and People v. Rutigliano, 261 N.Y. 103, 184 N.E. 689
(1933) (right to counsel).
275 See Brody, supra note 257, at 48-49; Heller, Admissions by Acquiescence, 15
U. MIAmi L. REV. 161, 173 n.99 (1960) ; Comment, 11 DE PAUL L. Rav. 307, 313-18
(1962); Note, 40 MINN. L. REv. 598, 607 (1956); Comment, 6 U.C.L.A. REv. 593,
601-02 (1959); cf. Falknor, Evidence, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 512, 517 (1957). Contra,
Comment, 13 ARK. L. REv. 123, 125 (1959). As to less recent views, compare Developments in the Law-Evidence, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1138, 1162-63 (1933) (favoring
rule), with 4 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1072(4), at 80-81 (3d ed. 1940) (opposing rule).
276A more detailed survey of the states and federal circuits appears in Brief
for Appellee, pp. 15-28, la-7a, Coleman v. United States, 306 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (per curiam).
277Alabama: E.g., Scott v. State, 249 Ala. 304, 30 So. 2d 689 (1947). Arizona:
State v. Lubetkin, 78 Ariz. 91, 276 P.2d 520 (1954) (by implication). Arkanas:
Boyd v. State, 230 Ark. 991, 328 S.W.2d 122 (1959). California: E.g., People v.
Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 401, 326 P.2d 457, 467, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866 (1958).
Delaware: Mezzatesta v. State, 53 Del. (3 Storey) 145, 166 A.2d 433 (1960).
Florida: E.g., Edwards v. State, 155 Fla. 550, 20 So. 2d 916 (1945). Georgia:
E.g., Emmett v. State, 195 Ga. 517, 25 S.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 774 (1943).
2d 388, 189 N.E.2d 287 (1963). Maine: State v.
Illinois: People v. Garreau, 27 Ill.
Reed, 62 Me. 129, 141-42 (1874). Michigan: People v. Kregger, 335 Mich. 457,
465-67, 56 N.W.2d 349, 353-54 (1953), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 929 (1958). But cf.
People v.Bigge, 288 Mich. 417, 285 N.W. 5 (1939) (dictum) (silence is no admis-
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twelve accept it,2 78 six have reserved the question,279 and twelve have
no clear position 280
In the federal system, one circuit rejects this
sion). Mississippi: Goldsby v. State, 240 Miss. 647, 675-77, 123 So. 2d 429, 439-41
(1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 861 (1961). Montana: State v. Louie Won, 76 Mont.
509, 248 Pac. 201 (1926). Nevada: Skidmore v. State, 59 Nev. 320, 92 P.2d 979
(1939) (dictum). New Hampshire: State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 488-89, 175
A.2d 814, 822 (1961) (semble), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 879 (1962). North Carolina:
State v. Riley, 188 N.C. 72, 123 S.E. 303 (1924) (post-arrest identification admitted
because defendant was silent). Ohio: State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 413, 112
N.E.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1951); cf. Murphy v. State, 36 Ohio St. 628 (1881) (after
apprehension by a railroad official). Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347
Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943). Tennessee: E.g., Watson v. State, 184 Tenn. 177, 197
S.W.2d 802 (1946), 19 TENN. L. REv. 840 (1947). West Virginia: State v. Booker,
68 W. Va. 8, 69 S.E. 295 (1910); State v. Belknap, 39 W. Va. 427, 19 S.E. 507
(1894). Wisconsin: Hardy v. State, 150 Wis. 176, 136 N.W. 638 (1912) (dictum).
278 Connecticut: State v. Bates, 140 Conn. 326, 99 A.2d 133 (1953), 15 U. PiTT.
L. REv. 376 (1954) ; State v. Ferrone, 97 Conn. 258, 116 Atl. 336 (1922) (dictum).
Indiana: Diblee v. State, 202 Ind. 571, 177 N.E. 261 (1931). Louisiana: E.g., State
v. Diskin, 34 La. Ann. 919 (1882) (alternative holding). Maryland: See Cooper
v. State, 231 Md. 248, 189 A.2d 620 (1963) ; Miller v. State, 231 Md. 215, 189 A.2d
635 (1963) (alternative holding). Massachusetts: E.g., Commonwealth v. Walker,
95 Mass. (13 Allen) 570 (1866) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.)
235 (1847). Missouri: E.g., State v. Young, 99 Mo. 666, 674, 12 S.W. 879, 881
(1889) (dictum). New York: E.g., People v. Rutigliano, 261 N.Y. 103, 184 N.E.
689 (1933). Oklahoma: E.g., Crabb v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 323, 192 P.2d 1018
(1948); see Vaughan v. State, 7 Okla. Crim. 685, 127 Pac. 264 (1911). Oregon:
ORE. RME. STAT. § 136.540(2) (1961), State v. Crater, 230 Ore. 513, 370 P.2d 700
(1962). Oregon's statute, adopted in 1957, see Oregon Laws 1957, ch. 567, § 2, is
the only state statute requiring exclusion of the defendant's silence when under
arrest. Rhode Island: State v. Marcello, 72 R.I. 382, 51 A.2d 828 (1947) ; State v.
Epstein, 25 R.I. 131, 55 AtI. 204 (1903) (alternative holding). Texas: E.g., Gardner
v. State, 34 S.W. 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896). Recent Texas cases have relied on
the statute regulating confessions to exclude silence after arrest, e.g., Sharp v. State,
153 Tex. Crim. 96, 217 S.W.2d 1017 (1949), although that statute does not appear
to be addressed to this question, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 727 (1941) ;
TEX. CoDE CRIm. PRoc. ANN. art. 727a (Supp. 1962). Gardner, however, which
apparently established the per se rule in Texas, relied on judicial rather than statutory authority. The Texas rule would thus appear to be independent of the statute.
Washington: State v. Redwine, 23 Wrash. 2d 467, 161 P.2d 205 (1945), 20 WAsH.
L. REv. 234; State v. McKenzie, 184 Wash. 32, 49 P.2d 1115 (1935) (dictum).
279 Hawaii: Territory v. Corum, 34 Hawaii 167, 178-80 (1937) (dictum) (sympathetic to per se rule). Minnesota: State v. Gulbrandsen, 238 Minn. 508, 57 N.W.2d
419 (1953). Nebraska: O'Hearn v. State, 79 Neb. 513, 113 N.W. 130 (1907); cf.
Vinciquerra v. State, 127 Neb. 541, 256 N.W. 78 (1934). New Jersey: State v.
Butler, 32 NJ. 166, 182-84, 160 A.2d 8, 17 (dictum), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 984
(1960) (questions wisdom of admitting silence when defendant is under arrest).
Utah: See State v. Farnsworth, 383 P.2d 489 (Utah 1963) (notes, but takes no
position on per se rule).

Virginia: Knight v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 433, 83

S.E.2d 738 (1954).
280Alaska: No cases found. Colorado: The cases have not faced the issue.
Idaho: Compare State v. Poynter, 34 Idaho 504, 205 Pac. 561 (1921) (admitted
defendant's failure to explain possession of liquor upon arrest), with State v. Bubis,
39 Idaho 376, 227 Pac. 384 (1924) (admitted accusation by sheriff based on hearsay;
held nonprejudicial error). Iowa: The cases conflict. Compare State v. Weaver,
57 Iowa 730, 11 N.W. 675 (1882) (alternative holding) (adopts per se rule), with
State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W. 275 (1941) (dictum), and State v.
Beckner, 197 Iowa 1252, 198 N.W. 643 (1924) (reverses because charge was
erroneous; per se rule issue not considered), and State v. Pratt, 20 Iowa 267 (1866)
(rejects per se rule in alternative holding because there was no trial objection).
Kansas: The cases imply that the per se rule would be rejected. See State v. Davis,
133 Kan. 571, 300 Pac. 1114 (1931); State v. Boswell, 119 Kan. 670, 240 Pac. 848
(1925). Kentucky: The cases are confused. Compare Senibaldi v. Commonwealth,
338 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1960) (admitting statements and conduct of accomplice in
front of defendant while they were out on bail), and Pierson v. Commonwealth,
229 Ky. 584, 595-97, 17 S.W.2d 697, 701-02 (1929) (dictum) (rejecting per se rule),.
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rule,28 1 five accept it,2 8 2 one has reserved the question, 2 8 and four have not
decided the issue.2 4 An 1895 Supreme Court dictum, in Sparf v. U-nited
States,285 admitted the evidence without analysis, but has largely been
ignored by the lower federal courts in recent years.2 8 6

No other Supreme

28 7

Court decision has expressly dealt with the question, although the current
Court may have manifested its attitude by a recent statement doubting the
with White v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 416, 166 S.W.2d 873 (1942) (dictum)
karrested defendant's silence in the face of accusations is inadmissible), and Lett v.
Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 267, 144 S.W.2d 505 (1940) (dictum) (disapproving evidence of arrested defendant's silence when accused). New Mexico: The cases have
not decided the issue. Compare State v. Hatley, 383 P.2d 247 (N.M. 1963) (dictum)
(quoting without comment a statement rejecting per se rule); State v. Gilliam, 60
N.M. 129, 288 P.2d 675 (1955) (admitting accusation after sheriff had arrived but
before arrest). North Dakota: No cases found. South Carolina:The cases are unclear.
Compare State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622 (1961) (dictum) (inadequate
objection at trial), and State v. Logue, 204 S.C. 171, 28 S.E.2d 788 (1944) (subsequent
confession by defendant), with State v. Evans, 202 S.C. 463, 25 S.E2d 492 (1942)
(dictum), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 750 (1943) (indicating that silence after arrest is
inadmissible), and State v. Hester, 137 S.C. 145, 181, 134 S.E. 885, 897 (1925) (alternative holding) ("This court has not looked with great favor upon the receipt of testimony
of this character when the accused was under arrest."). South Dakota: The cases
have not faced the issue. Compare State v. Ryan, 47 S.D. 596, 200 N.W. 1018 (1924)
(admitting failure of defendant's wife to explain possession of liquor when defendant
was arrested). Vermont: The cases have not faced the issue. Compare State v.
Taylor, 70 Vt. 1, 39 At. 447 (1896) (dictum) (admitting defendant's refusal to give
name and age to physician after arrest). Wyoming: No cases found.
281 Fifth Circuit: Tucker v. United States, 279 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1960).
282 Second Circuit: United States v. Lo Biondo, 135 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1943) (per
curiam). Fourth Circuit: See Hanger v. United States, 173 Fed. 54 (4th Cir. 1909)
(dictum). Sixth Circuit: See McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298 (6th Cir.
1928) (per curiam). Ninth Circuit: Sandez v. United States, 239 F.2d 239 (9th
Cir. 1956) (alternative holding).
Tenth Circuit: Yep v. United States, 83 F.2d
41 (10th Cir. 1936).
Mathes, Jury Instructions and Forms for Federal Criminal Cases, 27 F.R.D.
39, 60 (1961), restates the per se rule.
3
=District of Columbia Circuit: Kelly v. United States, 236 F.2d 746 (D.C.
Cir. 1956) (dictum) (suggesting the fifth amendment may bar this evidence). Previously the evidence was admitted in Dickerson v. United States, 65 F.2d 824 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 665 (1933).
284 First, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits.
285 156 U.S. 51, 53, 56 (1895)
(dictum).
The conviction was reversed and
remanded on other grounds; therefore no decision on this issue was necessary to the
holding.
286 However, Tucker v. United States, 279 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1960), and
Dickerson v. United States, 65 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 665
(1933), cited Sparf as authority for accepting the evidence.
2
87.All other cases presenting the issue have been decided on different grounds
or have not been heard by the Court. See Note, Silence as Incrimination in Federal
Courts, 40 MINN. L. REv. 598, 600 (1956). In United States v. On Lee, 193 F2d
306 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), the trial court admitted the defendant's post-arrest silence although he had previously denied guilt. The jury was
instructed, however, not to find a tacit admission in view of the denial prior to
arrest. (Actually the denial occurred after arrest.) The circuit court found the
error nonprejudicial, and on appeal the Supreme Court discussed only the search
and seizure issue presented by the case, saying that it was the only issue "of enough
general interest to merit discussion." 343 U.S. at 748. In effect, therefore, the
Court seems to have denied certiorari on the tacit admission question, although it
may have found no error, nonprejudicial error, or error cured by instructions. The
tacit admissions issue was argued to the Court. See Note, 40 MINx. L. REv. 598,

606 (1956).
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probative value of flight from the scene of a crime 288-evidence which is
said to reflect a consciousness of guilt,2 89 but which presents no hearsay
question.
Because of its clarity the scope of the rule has entailed little difficulty.
It applies only if the defendant is silent, or his reaction is "tantamount to
silence." 290 The rule has been properly applied to an accused free on
bail,291 and should be applied if the accused is in custody on another
charge.2 92 An accused free on bail may well rely on the safety of silence,
whereas an accused voluntarily in custody may be silent because of such
reliance or fear of the authorities.
2. A Broader Exclusionary Rule
Although the per se rule is a step in the right direction, it has had some
dubious consequences. The rule may require a determination by the
judge 293 of when the technical arrest occurred. 294 Several cases in per se
states admit evidence of the accusation if it took place just prior to the
technical arrest, although the police were present 95 One court so held
while stating that the "police officers would not have permitted the defend288 "[We have consistently doubted the probative value in criminal trials of
evidence that the accused fled the scene of an actual or supposed crime." Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483 n.10 (1963) (dictum); see Miller v.
United States, 320 F.2d 767, 770-71 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (opinion of Bazelon, C.J.).
Compare the view that flight ismore probative of guilt than silence. Commonwealth
v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 443, 32 A.2d 889, 900 (1943) (Maxey,C.J., dissenting).
289 See note 203 mipra.
290 State v. Thorne, 43 Wash. 2d 47, 59, 260 P.2d 331, 338 (1953) ; see State v.
Ferrone, 97 Conn. 258, 266, 116 Atl. 336, 339 (1922) (dictum); Commonwealth v.
Curry, 341 Mass. 50, 166 N.E.2d 714 (1960).
291 State v. Bates, 140 Conn. 326, 99 A.2d 133 (1953), 15 U. Pi-r. L. R-v.

376 (1954).
292 Such a factual situation was presented by State v. Goodwin, 127 S.C. 107,
120 S.E. 496 (1923); cf. State v. Johnson, 140 Conn. 560, 102 A.2d 359 (1954)
(accused voluntarily in police station).
293 There is a risk that the jury will ignore the issue and use the accusation
substantively if this decision is not made in advance. See McCoRMICK, EVIDENcE

§ 247(b) at 530 (1954).

But see Commonwealth v. Gangi, 243 Mass. 341, 137 N.E.

643 (1923).
As to procedure, it has been held that the admission of such evidence cannot be
cured by jury instructions. State v. Estoup, 39 La. Ann. 906, 3 So. 124 (1887).
But see United States v.On Lee, 193 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747
(1952). Ithas also been held that a subsequent confession by the formerly silent
accused makes his silence admissible. State v.Rini, 153 La. 57, 91-94, 95 So. 400,
412-13 (1922), appeal dismissed, 263 U.S. 689 (1924).
However, a subsequent
confession seems irrelevant to the tacit admission question. A holding of nonprejudicial error would avoid a needless retrial in a given case, but would make
the law more rational.
294 See De Lira v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 194, 297 S.W.2d 953 (1956) (when the
defendant reasonably believes that he is no longer at liberty).
295 State v. Rush, 286 S.W.2d 767 (Mo. 1956) ; see State v. Yochelman, 107 Conn.
148, 139 Atl. 632 (1927) ; State v. Lowery, 162 La. 465, 110 So. 721 (1926); State v.
Johnson, 35 La. Ann. 842 (1883); Commonwealth v. Saltzmann, 258 Mass. 109,
154 N.E. 562 (1927).
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ant to go away, but they did nothing to show their intention to hold him." 2 6
Yet the determination of when a technical arrest occurred 2 97 is a factor
seemingly without relation to the likelihood of a response, which depends
rather on the possible reliance on a policy of silence or fear of the authorities. The rule thus formulated can be easily evaded by the police, who
can precede the arrest by accusations of guilt. Other courts, looking more
to the purposes of the rule than its precise formulation, have excluded alleged tacit admissions when made in the presence of the police.298
The reasons for the rule indicate that it should apply if the confrontation occurred in the presence of official investigating authorities or after
the arrest of the accused. Suppose, however, that an accusation is made
in the absence of the police when the accused knows he is the subject of
grand jury proceedings. 29 9 Or suppose that it occurs during a directors'
meeting while the Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating
alleged corporate criminal activity,300 or that it happens after the accused
is apprehended by a private person, such as a railroad conductor 30 ' The
factor of reliance may well be present; fear will probably not be, except
perhaps in the last hypothetical. Moreover, it seems unlikely-although
not impossible--that the police would seek to evade the rule by arranging
for accusations in such cases. These considerations suggest that the exclusionary rule should not be extended to all accusations occurring after
the accused has knowledge that he is under criminal investigation, but that
the evidence should be excluded in such cases if the accused can persuade
that he relied on the
the trial judge that there was a substantial likelihood
30 2
safety of silence or that he was afraid to speak.
2096 Commonwealth v. Aronson, 330 Mass. 453, 459, 115 N.E.2d 362, 366 (1953).
But cf. Commonwealth v. Wallace, 190 N.E.2d 224, 229 (Mass. 1963), stating that,
for purposes of a statutory requirement that the police notify a parent of a juvenile
when he is "arrested," "there is no magic in the word 'arrest'; the detention of the

defendant and his submission to the control of the officer are the controlling factors."
(alternative
298 State v. Kissinger, 343 Mo. 781, 123 S.W.2d 81, 83 (1938)
holding) ("constructively in custody"); State v. Higgins, 321 Mo. 570, 576, 12
S.W.2d 61, 63 (1928) (alternative holding) ("constructively, if not actually, in custody") ; People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222, 225, 90 N.E.2d 48, 49 (1949) (dictum) (there
is "no obligation to speak at all when under arrest or about to be arrested"). (Em297 E.g., De Lira v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 194, 297 S.W.2d 953 (1956).
phasis added.) Wolgram v. State, 288 P.2d 203, 205 (Okla. 1955) (dictum) ("constructive
2 9 9 custody") ; Stach v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 280, 260 S.W. 569 (1924).
Knight v. State, 64 Tex. Crim. 541, 571-73, 144 S.W. 967, 971-73 (1912)
(admissible).
300 Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 380-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320

U.S. 788 (1943) (admissible).
301 Murphy v. State, 36 Ohio St. 628 (1881) (admissible).
302 At least two courts, in criticizing police abuses of the tacit admissions doctrine, have suggested that such evidence must be excluded unless the suspect was
warned that his failure to deny any accusations might be used against him, but
that otherwise any statements he made might be also used against him. People
v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 719, 172 P.2d 18, 29 (1946); Territory v. Corum, 34
Hawaii 167, 178 (1937) (alternative holding); accord, Comment, 11 DE PAUL
L. REv. 307, 318 (1962). One court justified the per se rule partially because a suspect "should not, while under arrest, be in a position where he should be told that
if he said anything it would be used against him and if he did not say anything that
likewise would be used against him." State v. Redwine, 23 Wash. 2d 467, 471,
161 P.2d 205, 207 (1945).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The ambiguity of silence, the prejudicial nature of the accusation which
is admitted to explain the silence, and the confessional nature of an inferred
admission suggest that an accused's silence should not be evidence of his
guilt if he can establish a substantial reason for his reaction consistent with
innocence. Attempts by the police to arrange potential tacit admissions,
the likelihood that an accused will fear to respond or seek refuge in an
often illusory right of silence, and the spirit of the privilege against selfincrimination indicate that all jurisdictions should adopt a rule that excludes
alleged admissions by silence if the incident occurred either while the
accused knew he was in the presence of the police or after his arrest.
Henry S. Hilles, Jr.

